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**SOUTH AFRICA AND
ITS NEIGHBOURS**

T. B. Millar

**MOSCOW'S EMERGING
BLITZKRIEG OPTION**

Manfred R. Hamm

CHILDBIRTH IN 1986

Dame Josephine Barnes

**THE SKETCHBOOKS
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SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS NEIGHBOURS

by T. B. Millar

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I FIRST visited South Africa in early 1977, as a guest lecturer for the South African Institute of International Affairs. It was a few months after the Soweto massacre and the Cape Town riots. The country was troubled but quiet; the government was in control. Its main fear was external. Government leaders and public servants expressed considerable apprehension of the Soviet Union which they believed was inspiring and supplying the anti-government African National Congress, supporting hostile leftist governments in South Africa's black neighbours, and preparing a possible invasion of South Africa to obtain its rich mineral deposits and/or deny these to the West. This was the so-called 'total onslaught' which the government of the Republic declared required a 'total response'.

In mid-1984 I returned for three months, again under the auspices of the SAIIA. The air was charged with tension and the threat of violence. There was a society in ferment — a ferment stimulated by the introduction of a new constitution that offered neither participation nor hope to the black majority population. The notion of 'total onslaught' had dropped into disfavour, at least with the South African foreign affairs ministry. By limited military actions and economic pressures, South Africa had come to terms with its neighbours who — except for Angolan support of the South West African People's Organisation, SWAPO — had ceased to threaten South African sovereignty.

Part of the reason for my visit in 1984 was to research aspects of regional security in southern Africa, ie in South Africa and its neighbourhood. For this purpose I visited Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, and tried unsuccessfully to get into Angola. It was in Maputo, capital of Mozambique, that the British Ambassador, Mr Eric Vines, on a huge wall map of southern Africa, showed me the vital strategic implications of the region's railway system. Railways are vital because this is a region of huge distances, often poor and limited roads, the earning of export income from a few primary commodities and (because of undeveloped local industries), the import of a high proportion of consumer no less than capital goods.

If the railways were all functioning well, Zaire would use the route

west through Benguela to the Angolan coast, Zambia would do the same, plus the route north-west to Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania, and the one south through Zimbabwe and the South African and Mozambique systems; Malawi would use Mozambique and South Africa, as would Zimbabwe; while Botswana would be dependent on South Africa. Unfortunately, many of the railways are *not* functioning well. The UNITA movement in Angola has for several years kept the Benguela route out of operation. Until very recently the Tanzania-Zambia (Tanzam, or Tazara) railway, built by the Chinese, has been in considerable disrepair. Renovated by the German Federal Republic, it still delivers to a gravely inefficient and inadequate port (Dar-es-Salaam). Railways in Mozambique, providing access to the sea for Malawi, Zimbabwe and South Africa, have been almost totally interdicted by the National Resistance Movement (Renamo), the only route kept reasonably open being the one from Mutare in Zimbabwe across to Beira on the Indian Ocean. This route also takes an oil pipeline and a road, and is guarded primarily by a sizeable number (5-7,000 estimate) of Zimbabwean troops — about a quarter of the Zimbabwean army. Even so, the route is very vulnerable, as is Beira itself, which South Africa demonstrated in a raid three years ago that severely damaged the oil pumping installations. The ports of Beira and Maputo are in considerable disrepair. The combined effect of all this is to make southern Africa overwhelmingly dependent on the South African railway system and rolling stock. Such dependence gives South Africa a considerable leverage over its neighbours, which serves both the general security of the Republic and its campaign against the African National Congress.

Lesotho is the southern African state most dependent on South Africa, being completely surrounded by South African territory. In this respect the Republic probably feels it showed considerable restraint in not toppling the authoritarian government of Prime Minister Chief Leboa Jonathan until January this year. The border is very porous, enabling ANC and Pan African Congress members and other South African dissidents to seek refuge but also enabling South Africa to exert pressures of various kinds. South African forces raided Maseru in December 1982, and Jonathan engaged in a brinkmanship with Pretoria perhaps on the assumption that it would not repeat the exercise out of deference to world opinion. If so, this was a mistake in judgement. In addition to offering a home to ANC, he adopted closer relations with the socialist bloc. Last December six ANC or PAC members and three Lesotho citizens were killed in Maseru, allegedly by the 'Lesotho Liberation Army', a revolutionary group widely believed to be supported by the South African Defence Force. In January this year South Africa put an economic blockade on Lesotho, which vainly sought international help. There can be little doubt that South Africa was involved in the military coup of 20 January which resulted in the lifting of the blockade and the expulsion by the new Military Council of scores of South African refugees to Zambia and elsewhere, so that the ANC has apparently been

forced to abandon Lesotho as an operational and mobilising base.

While this may appear a very satisfactory solution from South Africa's point of view, it has put a strain on the domestic political situation in Lesotho, where a return to a constitutional government not seen as a South African surrogate and having majority support is probably essential to stability. And while South Africa may feel that the outcome in Lesotho demonstrated the value of the economic weapon, no other of its neighbours is in a geographic or economic situation comparable to Lesotho's.

Swaziland is the next most vulnerable. Its economy is simply interwoven with South Africa's. Over 80 per cent of its imports come from South Africa, and 30 per cent of its exports go there (it has a rail link also to Maputo in Mozambique). Two-thirds of the recurrent revenue of the Swaziland government come from the South African Customs Union, and Swaziland is a member of the Rand Monetary Agreement. In 1982 it signed a security agreement with South Africa similar to the Nkomati Accord under the terms of which it resists the use of its territory by the ANC. According to reports, early last year Swazi authorities rounded up several dozen ANC members who had entered the country illegally from Mozambique and deported them. This again is satisfactory to South Africa, but Swaziland is not representative of the region, and its domestic politics are fragile.

The third of the former British 'High Commission' territories, Botswana, is in a very different situation. It has a population of about one million occupying 60,000km² (somewhat larger than France), with a 1,600km border with South Africa. Although the Botswana government, one of Africa's few democracies, refuses to have a security pact with South Africa and stoutly claims that it does not allow refugees (whether ANC or SWAPO), to operate against South Africa, it has no way of enforcing such a policy. Accordingly South Africa obligingly engages in its own enforcement policy in Botswana. In June 1985 it raided what it said were ANC bases in Gaborone, killing 12 people, and threatened to send its commandos back for a 'repeat performance'. The Botswana government, while protesting vigorously, agreed to use its 'best endeavours' to stop ANC fighters transiting the country and apparently encouraged some ANC people to leave, but not to Pretoria's satisfaction. The 'repeat performance' took place in May of this year.

Botswana's main rail link with the outside world is via South Africa, and the country takes 80 per cent of its imports from there. South Africa is the largest investor, especially in diamonds, copper, nickel and coal. Botswana is not a member of the Rand Monetary Agreement. It strongly desires independence from South Africa but its range of action is extremely limited.

In Mozambique South Africa has fallen victim to its own double dealing in a situation over which it has limited control. Mozambique signed the Nkomati Accord in March 1984 in the hope that South Africa would (a) stop supporting the right wing resistance movement in the

country, the MNR or Renamo, and (b) would help in the recovery of the basket case Mozambiquan economy. South Africa signed it primarily to get the Frelimo government to cease supporting the ANC, which apparently has largely happened. South Africa, both government and private enterprise, has given some economic support to Mozambique, but the Accord was seriously jolted by the discovery in August 1985, when Zimbabwean and Mozambiquan troops overran the MNR headquarters at Gorongosa in central Mozambique, of a diary detailing the continued military and moral support by South Africa of the MNR, the declared objective being the overthrow of the Frelimo government.

South African support without control of the MNR has helped keep Mozambique in a state of continued disorder. The MNR so far has not been strong enough to overthrow the Machel government, but it is strong and unruly enough to keep dislocated the communications without which South African aid cannot be effective, and virtually to destroy the Cahora Bassa project for supplying electricity to South Africa. Mozambique has also accused South Africa of 'commercial aggression' through discounting of rail, port and shipping charges for freight traffic from the Transvaal, Swaziland and Zimbabwe which would otherwise use Maputo,² and by getting Swaziland to agree to a new rail link between Komatipoort and Richards Bay which will take further traffic away from Maputo. In fact, as mentioned above, the MNR with South African help has dislocated all rail traffic across Mozambique.

South Africa has tried to bring Frelimo and the MNR together for negotiations, but its credit rating as a mediator was seriously affected by the Gorongosa documents. Western economic aid to Mozambique and some Soviet bloc military aid, as well as sheer inertia, have helped keep the Machel government from total collapse, but it is hard to see how the MNR could cohabit with Frelimo, or that it could itself become the government, or if it *did* that it could be any more effectual than the Machel regime. That regime has not formally denounced Nkomati presumably because there would be no profit and some loss if it did.

Zimbabwe is the most formidable of South Africa's neighbours because it is the most developed and with the most efficient government and infrastructure. It can normally feed itself and in good years (like this one) exports grain. Legacies of the Rhodesia period include extensive South African investments and sizable though not overwhelming trade (South Africa provides about 30 per cent of imports and takes about 20 per cent of exports). Because of MNR interdiction of railways, Zimbabwe is dependent on South African routes and rolling stock. From well before independence South Africa intervened in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe's internal security situation and continued to do so after independence on the assumption that the Mugabe government was of communist inclinations and was actively supporting the ANC.

The fact that the main opposition to the ZANU (PF) government came from areas adjoining South Africa gave opportunities for 'destabilisation' through raids, aid to dissidents and propaganda which apparently

still continues in the form of broadcasts in Ndebele inciting the Ndebeles against the Shonas. Although a *modus vivendi* has been worked out between the two governments, Zimbabwe has accused South Africa of planning a dissident movement along the lines of the MNR in Mozambique. Whether or not there is any truth in that, relations if relatively correct are much less than cordial, as the recent (and earlier) raids show. Prime Minister Mugabe will undoubtedly continue to assist the ANC, perhaps more discreetly, but apart from that he can't do very much more than grind his teeth and make angry public statements, partly because of his economic dependence on South Africa but also because of his domestic problems. Although he has managed to institute a 'one-party state', the inherent tribal competitions within ZANU and the contradictions between theory and practice by party leaders are catching up with him (or it). The possibility of an attempted coup is in many minds. Mugabe could not at present use South Africa as a scapegoat to resolve internal difficulties, but if South Africa were to develop serious problems of internal security any Zimbabwean government is likely to do what it could to exacerbate the situation.

Zambia, with which South Africa (or, more correctly, Namibia) shares a border along the Caprivi Strip, poses fewer problems for South Africa. The border is much tighter, there is not the cross-border movement, and the Zambian government casts itself much more in a mediatory role. The cutting by UNITA of the Benguelan railway has made Zambia more dependent on South African routes plus the recently refurbished line through to the coast at Dar-es-Salaam. It is perhaps surprising that South Africa has not sent commandos to cut the railway, except that it would look very bad and in any case South Africa probably could not physically handle the transport of Zambian copper. South Africa is the main source of Zambia's consumer goods, but the country is poor, with income depleted by the drop in world prices for copper (almost its sole export income earner), and has border problems with Zaire. It offers no threat to South Africa. Nor does Malawi, which came to terms with Pretoria years ago and has reaped appropriate economic and political benefits.

Since 1975 South Africa has steadily built up the size and sophistication of its forces operating in Angola, commensurate with the Soviet equipment and Cuban troops deployed against it by the MPLA government. Recently, apparently, Angola has also been buying French helicopters and British communications equipment. The nature and size of the South African forces operating against SWAPO in Namibia and in Angola in conjunction with UNITA, and with US support, are not public knowledge. When I was in Windhoek in September 1984 I was briefed by a South African intelligence officer, and it was clear that much of the information he gave me we both knew to be erroneous. What is not in doubt is that the armed conflict is continuing, despite accords reached between Angola and South Africa under Zambian and US auspices. The recent naval raid on Namibe was a reminder of South Africa's strike

capacity

Angola is unable and probably unwilling to dampen the ardour of the SWAPO forces. It cannot destroy UNITA in present circumstances. South Africa has said that it won't withdraw from Namibia while there are Cuban troops in Angola, but its incursions into Angola provide reason or excuse for those forces to remain. May the Republic perhaps be glad of the Cuban presence, as justifying its Namibian policies? The Multi-Party Conference in Namibia is working away at a new constitution which South Africa hopes will produce a non-SWAPO government, yet most commentators are convinced that any genuinely democratic election would bring SWAPO to power. It seems extremely likely that if that were to occur the regime would quickly adopt authoritarian practices to ensure it remains in power. South Africa would then be faced by an unfriendly regime across the Orange River, although this is a more manageable border than that on Namibia's north. The Angola-Namibia situation is extremely expensive for South Africa at a time when the economy is increasingly hard pressed by the fallen rand and the now almost certainty of international sanctions. The armed conflict has required the use of conscripts, to evident although still manageable social protest.

I believe that South Africa remains in Namibia mainly because of the inherent difficulty that all governments face about giving up territory in situations other than when facing *force majeure*. Investment, including in minerals (diamonds, uranium) is a factor, but not the main factor. To give up the Caprivi Strip and Walvis Bay would be considered a strategic loss. If South Africa and the US were to abandon UNITA, and the Soviet bloc to build up the Angolan forces even further, this would not necessarily solve any problems. The MPLA government is divided, and hopelessly inefficient.

South Africa has thus come to dominate its neighbours by a combination of military and economic means, which the Southern African Development Coordination Committee and international political pressures and aid programmes have been unable to change. As indicated earlier, the emphasis of South Africa's policies towards its neighbours has shifted, especially in the last 4-5 years, from concern at a Soviet-backed 'total onslaught' including military attack from neighbours, to concern at the internal security problems posed by the ANC and the PAC, including Eastern bloc support of armed insurrection. That is, the principal security concern has become mainly internal where it used to be mainly external.

It is important to query the influence of the South African Defence Force and the military generally within government, and the effect of this on external policies. Despite some press comment and contrary to the impression which I was given in Pretoria and heard in Maputo, the Gorongosa documents don't indicate to me any great division between Foreign Affairs and Defence, nor between the higher and lower levels of Defence. On the contrary, they indicate a considerable degree of collusion in both cases. I find it difficult to judge the degree of military

influence inside government, but with security having so high a profile, and with President Botha's long experience as Minister for Defence, the influence must be considerable

I have come to the conclusion that internal security problems will increasingly dominate external policies, on several grounds. Internal security is deteriorating, and the number and severity of incidents — of blacks against white and blacks against blacks — seems likely to demand an expanding use of the SADF in such situations, a role for which it would have little zest. The right wings of Afrikanerdom are going to make it harder for State President Botha to make concessions to black power, and it is by no means sure where the sympathies of internal security forces will ultimately lie: they currently appear and probably will continue to be divided, and that could be disastrous. These two pressures on the State could lead to a reduction of SADF strength in Namibia, on which SWAPO and Angola would be likely to capitalise, and to a reduced role in other border areas. The increasing use of the SADF in home situations, and the divisions within Afrikanerdom, will raise the question of a military takeover of government, while a serious breakdown in internal security would cause a deterioration of the effectiveness of policies towards regional neighbours and could incite them to greater hostility.

I have not discussed the concept of a 'constellation' of states, which I believe was never viable, nor considered whether South Africa has had short term and long term objectives further ahead than next week. It has taken its targets where it has seen them. Yet it *has* had a strategy; (a) ensuring regional economic dependence while (b) encouraging political and military weakness so that no neighbour constituted a military threat. So far (a) has been successful and (b) did not need South African assistance in order to happen — the regimes have succumbed to their own inadequacies. The *realpolitik* of (a) has largely subsumed the antagonism aroused by (b), but there must be doubts that it will continue to do so if South Africa's internal security deteriorates beyond a certain point.

NOTES

1 *Citizen*, 28 December 1985

2 *The Guardian* (Botswana), 13 December 1985, reprinting an article by Patti Woldmeir in the *Financial Times*

A version of the above article was given to a seminar at Chatham House, London in May 1986

[Professor of Australian Studies and Head of the Australian Studies Centre, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London. Professor Millar is on leave from the Australian National University, where he is Professorial Fellow in International Relations.]

MOSCOW'S EMERGING BLITZKRIEG OPTION

by Manfred R. Hamm

NATO planners are increasingly worried about Moscow's growing ability to launch an attack against Western Europe without NATO being able to exercise its nuclear option. Last year in May, NATO's Military Committee concluded that NATO's conventional forces might be overrun before a political decision could be made to employ nuclear weapons. In such a hopeless situation, our European allies would probably prefer defeat and surrender to wanton nuclear destruction.

If the Warsaw Pact acquired such a capability, NATO's strategy of 'flexible response' would no longer be viable — if it ever was more than a political solution to a presisting military dilemma. Flexible response is based on the assumption that any East-West conflict will rapidly go nuclear, involving ultimately American strategic nuclear strikes against the Soviet homeland. This is the risk Soviet planners must neutralise to gain a viable attack option against NATO Europe. Thus, if the Soviet Union could prevent NATO from retaliating with nuclear weapons and dissuade the US from employing the strategic systems of the central balance, the risks associated with a deliberate attack on Western Europe might appear tolerable to Soviet planners.

In order to tackle the threat of NATO nuclear escalation, the Soviets are in the process of combining two emerging developments in military technology with a well-proven, bold operational concept that holds the prospect of destroying NATO's defence capabilities without the need to use nuclear weapons. They are deploying advanced ballistic missiles of short and intermediate-range which carry either chemical or 'smart' conventional submunitions. In addition, they are perfecting their ballistic missile defences against NATO Pershing-IIs and land or sea-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles. This gives them the needed offensive capabilities and adequate damage limitation potential to contemplate an attack on NATO Europe.

This combination of weapons and offensive strategy to outflank or contain NATO's nuclear potential gives Moscow a realistic option for a pre-emptive attack. Effective pre-emption will keep NATO off balance and hamper its efforts to organize a coherent defence against Warsaw Pact penetrations of NATO territory. It gives them a potential similar to Hitler's tank forces and Stuka dive bombers that were the backbone of his Blitzkrieg attack against Polish and French defences in the early stages of World War II.

Hitler's Blitzkrieg strategy worked so well because many European leaders had drawn the wrong lessons from the costly trench warfare of the First World War. They firmly believed that offensive forces were unable to overcome entrenched defences. Hence, the French felt quite secure behind their heavily fortified 'Maginot Line'. Similarly, the total commitment of nations to support a war rendered war for limited

objectives anachronistic or at least unthinkable. Accordingly, war was no longer viewed as a rational instrument of national foreign policy. Not surprisingly, they became complacent, thus allowing Hitler to take advantage of his new strategy that married new technology with novel strategic and tactical principles for optimal effect

As in the 1930s, the spectre of nuclear war today has given the West, in particular the Europeans, a sense of complacency, not to say futility. Many have concluded that there is little hope for aggression to succeed against an opponent who possesses the ability to initiate a global holocaust. As a result, few fear direct Soviet aggression on Western Europe or are afraid of political intimidation so long as NATO retains the capacity to threaten credible nuclear retaliation. But it is increasingly uncertain whether NATO indeed still possesses that capability

For years, Moscow has been diligently trying to attenuate the major risks of an attack on NATO Europe. Depriving NATO of its nuclear option is the *sine qua non* of any successful operational plan for offensive operations against Western Europe. Therefore, they opposed NATO Pershing-II and groundlaunched cruise missile (GLCM) deployment and are now themselves deploying shorter-range ballistic missiles, the modern SS-21s, SS-22s, and SS-23s which can cover most of Western Europe when launched from as far away as the Soviet Union or eastern Poland. With nearly 300 nuclear armed triple warhead SS-20s as backup, these shorter-range missiles are designed to pre-empt NATO's about 300 critical targets at the outset of hostilities. Among these priority targets are NATO nuclear storage sites, airfields and port facilities, missile launch installations — the Pershings and GLCMs are launched from pre-designated launchpoints — as well as NATO's entire command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) infrastructure

Moreover, this initial missile salvo will cripple NATO's air defences and cut considerably the sortie-rate of NATO's air forces. This will allow Warsaw Pact forces not only to harass NATO troops deploying to their defensive positions, it will disrupt NATO mobilization. Most critically, NATO will have lost air superiority in the theatre upon which it relies for close-in air support of its troops on the ground. Without air support, NATO's outnumbered and outgunned groundforces stand little chance to hold back a Warsaw Pact attack, even if it is unreinforced. In a fully reinforced attack, it would be more difficult to capitalise on the element of surprise but the force-ratios would favour the Warsaw Pact even more dramatically, if only because political restraint and indecision will have kept NATO from fully mobilizing

Complementing its air offensive against NATO, Soviet forces will exploit gaps in NATO's thin and brittle defences along the East-West fault-line. Although it will be difficult for the Warsaw Pact to have force ratios sufficient to overrun NATO's defences along the entire frontline in a 'standing start' attack, the Soviets will be able to concentrate their forces at critical sectors of the front. Their operational manoeuvre groups (OMGs), these highly mobile and flexible units, will be ready to sweep

through and exploit breakthroughs in NATO's linear defences. The OMGs are specifically laid out to disrupt NATO forces, create havoc in the rear areas, seek out and destroy NATO nuclear weapons and to tie down NATO reinforcements before they reach the battle.

If Moscow proceeds with its own BMD and ATBM systems, NATO will be deterred from escalating a conflict to the nuclear level. Indeed it may not have the physical ability to launch sufficient numbers of nuclear weapons to penetrate Soviet defences. After an initial missile attack against NATO nuclear assets, the alliance may have too few long-range nuclear weapons left in the European theater to pose a credible retaliatory threat to Moscow. The strategic nuclear forces of the US triad may also be ineffective against a full-fledged Soviet BMD system. Conversely, the central strategic balance may become irrelevant to deter aggression in Western Europe if potential US defences would at least be able to partially absorb or neutralize a Soviet strategic attack against the United States.

Many consider this scenario too alarmist. Indeed we do not yet confront it, but it is just over the horizon. Because of the long lead times involved in fielding highly complex weapons systems, NATO must decide now on how to counter this emerging Soviet Blitzkrieg threat. The problem has been studied by NATO councils since the early 1980s, even long before President Reagan proclaimed the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) or 'Star Wars'. If NATO remains defenceless against Soviet precision conventional/chemical missile attacks, all other attempts to raise the nuclear threshold by bolstering its conventional defence capabilities will be for naught. Whether you call it the 'Rogers Plan', Follow-on-forces attack (FOFA), deep strike, or Airland Battle, all these defence concepts pre-suppose a relatively survivable NATO defence infrastructure.

How then should NATO respond? The answer should be obvious. Some European and American strategists have suggested a missile defence system for Europe which, in conjunction with stronger conventional forces and barrier defences along the inter-German border might be able to blunt a Soviet onslaught. An ATBM system for Europe would protect primarily key military assets but because of the density of the population, millions of civilians would be protected as well. On May 22, 1986 NATO's Defence Planning Committee agreed to recommend defence against short-range ballistic missiles as a common planning goal. This decision was endorsed by Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) General Bernard Rogers as well as allied defence ministers.

Writing in the January 1986 issue of the US journal *Strategic Review*, West German defence minister Manfred Woerner made a cogent and compelling case for considering ballistic missile defences as integral components of an extended air defence system for NATO Europe. Earlier, European groups with US sponsors had called for a European Defence Initiative (EDI) to complement the US SDI program. An ATBM-based EDI system was to augment the capabilities of the US ballistic missile defence and prevent strategic discontinuities from arising. Already in

October 1983, the Future Security Strategy Study (FSSS) headed by Fred Hoffman had called for the deployment of an ATBM system in Europe.

In recent months, Senators Dan Quayle (R-Ind) and Pete Wilson (R-Cal) have been the chief proponents of ATBM defences. They have tried to gain a set aside of \$50 million for ATBM research in which the NATO allies and Israel, ostensibly the chief beneficiaries of such a system were to participate with matching funds. Contrary to their professed concern about NATO's missile vulnerability of NATO, Israel and South Korea to name the key allies, it is their primary objective to establish early deployment options for a US terminal defence of military assets, particularly hardened missile sites and command bunkers. Because they distrust General Abrahamson's long term research approach, they seek allied participation which might yield faster results and get the programme on stream before political support for SDI begins to dissipate.

In US congressional politics, forging coalitions for ulterior motives is all too common. Partisan politics is far less determinative than in most parliamentary democracies of Western Europe. Inasmuch as Senators Quayle and Wilson are fervent supporters of a European ATBM today, the US Congress may well curtail the SDI programme so much as to push back the decision date into the late 1990's. The point is, that a NATO ATBM system is needed regardless to what happens to 'Star Wars' either in the US Congress or at the bargaining table at Geneva. It is needed on its own merits. Soviet missile deployments rather than the SDI schedule should determine the scope and speed of ATBM deployment in Europe. Therefore, European governments should take the lead in this area. Europe's security is too important in this critical area to be a hostage of an unpredictable US political process. It is in this field that Europe can prove to the US that it can take responsibility for its own defence without being lectured or pressured to do so by the US.

A European programme, moreover, would in no way come into conflict with the 1972 ABM Treaty between the superpowers and establish a viable defence option that could eventually complement a US 'Star Wars' system. But even if such a system were never built and President Ronald Reagan's vision never became reality for political, technical, arms control, or fiscal reason or any combination thereof, Europe would possess an ATBM system capable of denying Moscow the Blitzkrieg option to which it has aspired since the mid-1960's. Whether the European NATO allies proceed with an ATBM system may be more important than whether they build more tanks, procure more and better aircraft, or meet established NATO wartime supply targets.

[Manfred R. Hamm is a Visiting Fellow at The Heritage Foundation and Adjunct Professor of Strategy in the National Security Studies Programme of Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. He will be developing the theme of the above article in *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 1987.]

THE DILEMMA OF DENATIONALISATION

by Filip Svetic

ACCORDING to Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, one of the priorities of the new right-wing government in France will be to reprivatise all banks and a good part of the public sector in the economy. Edouard Balladur has been appointed not only the head of the central ministry of the economy and finance, but also minister for reprivatisation. How this priority task can actually be carried out, and at what pace, given the very narrow right-wing majority in parliament and the fact that socialist Francois Mitterrand stands at the head of the state is another matter. This is not just a purely economic move; it reflects a deep ideological division over the process of denationalisation which can have a strong impact on the future development of the national economy.

The wave of nationalisation, which is called de-statisation, or simply the sale of state and public property, is spreading in various parts of the world, from Great Britain, where it originally started in the late seventies, via the majority of other western capitalist states, to the third world countries. The strengthening of the private sector in the People's Republic of China or Hungary, for instance, and the very debate over economic reforms in the majority of socialist countries, can, in the opinion of some theoreticians, be seen as a part of this same process.

However, the privatisation of state or public property is too complicated and complex a process to be generalised, even if a clear definition were to exist for denationalisation which in Great Britain basically implies selling more than fifty per cent of the value of state property, while in other countries even the smallest sale of state property into private hands is called privatisation or, even more often, de-statisation. Major differences also exist in the motives behind putting public property back into private hands. The conditions under which this process evolves are not identical.

Hence, the growing interest among analysts in studying all aspects of the phenomenon of denationalisation, not only in terms of the usually underscored economic inefficiency of state enterprises, but also from the ideological, political, social and even culturological standpoint. Only such comprehensive study can give a fuller solution to the many dilemmas that are arising and to the question of where the boundaries of reprivatising state property lie.

The thesis launched by the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government, that extensive state interference in the economy kills private initiative and leads to economic catastrophe is too much of an over-simplification to serve as a general prescription for returning state property into the hands of private capital, regardless of the fact that arguments about the inefficiency, unprofitability or uncompetitiveness of a large number of state 'fossils', as they are often mockingly called, are correct in some cases and not only in terms of Great Britain. The

British government's decision to open the doors to reprivatization came after a global analysis of the business operations of state enterprises and public services. These analyses reportedly showed that the public sector is creating enormous losses, that it is unprofitable and uncompetitive and that state budgets are weighed down by necessary subsidies. This situation, according to these analyses, is incurable, be it a question of Western Europe where the process of nationalisation has assumed the broadest proportions, especially in Great Britain, or in the United States or third world countries. Some people, probably with reason, warn that the analyses did not take into account the fact that assessments of state enterprise efficiency were made at a time when the world economy was going through its worst recession on account of the oil crisis, and when even many private companies were in serious trouble. The monetaristic theory of Milton Friedman offered an answer by saying that subsidies to state enterprises should be stopped and state ownership should be reduced to a minimum, otherwise the problem will only get worse.

This was clearly one of the underlying theoretical postulates for launching the process of denationalisation in Great Britain and in other countries where, as in the German Federal Republic or the United States, and now France, a conservative government has come to power; but also, albeit to a smaller degree, in some other capitalist countries as well. The list of privatised enterprises is already quite long, and in the British Isles it includes companies that are of key importance to the national economy, such as the oil industry, telecommunications, maritime and air traffic, the Jaguar car factory and Vickers, the only nuclear submarine manufacturing plant. At the start of 1986, a new wave of sales was announced for the next two years. The list includes Gas, British Airways, London Transport, Rolls-Royce plane and engine factory. A similar fate awaits the National Coal Board and possibly Water, although in the latter case the necessary legislation has been postponed.

In the Federal German Republic a similar process is under way although — as with Italy, Sweden, Turkey, Spain, Japan or the United States — to a smaller degree. West German Finance Minister Stoltenberg's programme envisages, among the country's ten or so state enterprises, at least partial denationalisation for such economic giants as Volkswagen and Lufthansa. In Italy, although socialist Craxi still heads the government, the process of privatisation is motivated by the need to reduce the approximately 4 billion dollars in state enterprise losses. Spain's socialist government interprets privatisation as a radical dismantling of Franco's economic system where the Instituto Nacional de Industria (INI) embraced some 750 industrial companies accounting for 95% of state ownership, and amassed about three billion dollars in losses and about five billion dollars in foreign debts.

In Germany's debates over privatisation developed into an ideological conflict between political parties over the country's future economic and social development. Mrs Thatcher is criticised, again along ideological lines, for trying, through the complete reprivatization of state property,

to infuse the country with an enterprising ideology of the American type which, in the conviction of many people, even in conservative circles, has no historical or cultural grounds in the British Isles. Furthermore, in Britain as in other countries of state capitalism in Europe, one must not forget the strength of the trade unions which usually oppose sale of state enterprises in production and services. They oppose it because it threatens jobs, an understandably sensitive point given the already high unemployment rate but also because they see in these enterprises, and especially in public services, one of the main achievements of the welfare state. In Japan and the United States this is much less important, because the volume of state and public ownership is in itself much smaller than in Western Europe. That is why the Japanese government's plan to denationalise partly not only telecommunications but also the state railway is motivated exclusively by economic reasons. Namely, the railway is Japan's biggest lame duck and, in the years since the war it has incurred losses that are counted in billions.

Yet Great Britain is still the world's biggest testing ground for the phenomenon of nationalisation and its practical application. Officials of several dozen countries, including developing and socialist states, have sought arguments in London for or against privatisation. The dilemmas that have emerged are being closely followed. First, there is the question of how to prove that the public sector is more inefficient than the private sector, at least with regard to the system of management. Robert Milward, a lecturer at the University in Salford says that there is no general basis for believing that management efficiency is lower in state enterprises, which runs completely counter to the government's arguments. Examples in France, where all publicly owned enterprises are operating at a profit and where even Renault, the only state enterprise making a loss is about to join them, support this theory, which does not automatically equate the entire public sector with inefficiency, especially as public enterprises and services have an importance more than just profit-making, which is the only motive of private capital. On the other hand, the creation of private monopolies would be still more problematic than those in the public sector, which can be influenced by the state, given the broader social interests that do not bind private companies. The conservative government in Great Britain maintains that management would be better in private monopolies because they would act, plan and invest without the political influence and interference of the state in business.

Nor is the dilemma resolved over whether denationalisation, with the presumed efficiency and competitiveness of the private sector, always works to the advantage of consumers. This question is especially pertinent with regard to public services or enterprises of strategic importance to the national economy. In the creating of so-called 'popular' capitalism the employees and their families are given priority in the sale of shares.

The formula of *capitalismo popular* is being tried in Chile, a third world country which has gone furthest in the process of de-statisation.

It has done so for entirely ideological reasons because General Pinochet's military junta unreservedly accepts all ideas of the Chicago economic school. Two years ago the military regime began privatising two of the country's biggest banks (Banco de Santiago and Banco de Chile), and continued with the sale of state enterprises, including power companies. The purchase of shares and the creation of *capitalismo popular* is also stimulated by lower taxes on profit which is very attractive at any rate to people in the higher and middle income brackets. Partial de-statisation of some twenty banks and about 300 enterprises has already been carried out.

The list of enterprises up for sale in some other third world countries is growing. A particular case is the Philippines during Marcos's time, where nationalisation had come about because of the bankruptcy of private companies which the state had rescued, but there are also other newly industrialised countries in Southeast Asia where this applies, such as Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. In Mexico, for instance, the government programme envisages the complete or partial denationalisation of some 250 enterprises, including automobile plants, the state hotel chain and the national airlines. However, so far, only about thirty, mostly smaller enterprises have been sold. President Jose Sarney of Brazil declared that the process of economic development must now shift to the private sector free of the fetters of statism. A strong state sector was created in Brazil during the twenty-year-long military dictatorship for strategic among other reasons. Behind the stand of the civilian government, which many local government officials oppose, lie the heavy debts of state enterprises, so that privatisation is justified as soon as possible as a way of repaying foreign debts.

One cannot ignore the interest of foreign capital in purchasing these enterprises and this is something that certain countries, even western capitalist states, seriously fear, especially when enterprises of strategic importance are in question. Indeed, this is one of the main motives for restricting the process of denationalisation and retaining sufficient state shares to guarantee state control.

As for the socialist countries, strengthening the private sector is only one of the measures being taken to improve business efficiency and mobilise all resources for accelerated development. It should be remembered that nationalisation was one of the first economic steps taken by the socialist states and former colonies, i.e. 'the expropriation of the expropriators'. Revolutionary social changes have been based on public ownership as a means of production. That is why it is hard to equate the open-door policy to limited private economic activity with the British-type of denationalisation, or with countries of the third world.

SWEDISH POLITICS: THE BEGINNING OF THE END OF AN ERA? (Part 2)

by Richard Pybus

CUTS in public expenditure, proposed by the Swedish non-socialist parties, Mr Feldt dismissed as 'typical bourgeois threats to welfare'. When Mr Westerburg suggested that, were the SDAP to reduce the budget deficit by a necessary £1.5-2 bn. in the coming year, they too would have to cut expenditure — or add to an already massive tax burden, Mr Feldt, the Swedish Finance Minister, insisted that there were 'plenty of ways' to 'scrape it together' without resorting to welfare cuts or adding to the tax burden, but declined to say what any of them might be. (After the election, his budget was applauded by the Moderates inasmuch as it embodied many of their proposals, though the measures had been vilified both by Mr Palme and Kjell Olof Feldt at the time)

Mr Feldt promised that unemployment would continue to be reduced, as it had been since the SDAP resumed power in 1982. Official figures from Statistics Sweden, showing unemployment to have increased since 1982, presented by the Centrist representative, Mr Feldt dismissed as 'bourgeois lies'. A similar interpretation was put upon a graph showing the same trend in unemployment, published by LO (the Swedish equivalent of the TUC) and presented by the Moderate representative (later Mr Palme was to explain that this LO graph, though not actually wrong, of course, was 'based on false premises'). Against all current evidence, Mr Feldt declared himself confident that the outlook for Swedish industry and exports was excellent, and nothing his interlocutors could say impinged upon his insouciance. (Well after the election, when Sweden, like much of the industrialised world, was enjoying the unexpected blessing of plunging oil prices, Mr Feldt was to adopt a complacent, 'I told you so' attitude)

That Sweden's penalistic tax system places an immense burden upon the populace is always stoutly denied by the SDAP. The head of LO (TUC) said he didn't for a minute think that heavy taxes were the reason for so many rich Swedes emigrating; astonishingly, nobody pressed him to suggest any other possible reason (the election campaign was liberally sprinkled with such missed opportunities). Mr Palme said high taxation in Sweden was a 'bourgeois myth'; with the air of someone whose patience is almost entirely exhausted by repeatedly having to explain the obvious to slow-witted and recalcitrant children, he spelled it out succinctly: 'A very, very small minority of very wealthy Swedes pay something approaching 50% in tax. They can afford it, and can always comfort themselves that they are making a valuable contribution to the welfare of their less fortunate countrymen.'

The facts are rather different. According to *Statistics Sweden*, the average wage for a junior industrial worker is about £10,000 per annum, of which £3,500 is drawn in tax at source (PAYE), at current prices, the remaining £6,500 will be absorbed by the cost of living, thus contributing

a further £1,525 in MOMS (VAT), which is levied on everything, even food, at 23.46% Thus an average Swedish worker pays at least 50% in tax, and if payroll taxes — which are in effect concealed employee taxation — are taken into consideration, he pays nearer to 65%.

The New Poverty, the report of an investigation initiated by TV News (Aktuellt), revealed that 1.4 million households (N.B. households, not individual members of the 8.5 m. population) are so badly off that an unexpected bill is all it requires to scuttle their budgeting entirely, and that half of them exist below subsistence level in conditions comparable to the economic distress of the 'thirties. Though the middle class is slowly being strangled, the hardest burden falls upon the lower income categories. That this should be so after more or less half a century of mixed economy socialism is far less of a mystery than that the lower income groups continue to believe that the SDAP has their interests at heart.

Though the SDAP managed to get into office, their dependence upon the VPK rendered them vulnerable to pressure from the VPK, who thus wield power in the Riksdag out of proportion to the number of their seats — as was soon shown when they joined SDAP malcontents in demanding that tax on stockmarket profits be doubled, thereby forcing Mr Palme to renege on one of his few specific campaign promises. Not only was an articulate faction of the SDAP now demanding Mr Palme's resignation, but local government election results had shown serious cracks to be opening up in the edifice of SDAP hegemony in many parts of the country.

The SDAP movement embraces a wide network of nationwide organisations: the Party itself; the SSU and the Young Eagles (SDAP youth organisations), the People's House movement (the network of Trade Union meeting houses built and run at the ratepayers' expense), Konsum (the Cooperative Society), Solidar (the Coop chain of grocery shops and departmental stores); HSB, Riksborgen and BPA (the Trade Union builders and contractors), Folksam (the Coop insurance company), RESO (the People's Travel and Holiday Organisation), and the Tenants' Association. All these interrelated organisations envelope themselves in a coven of understanding with regard to mutual aid and the exclusion of non-SDAP interests from areas of influence. This is the SDAP Brotherhood.

Nowhere was it more solidly entrenched than in Sweden's third largest city, Malmö, in the southern province of Scania. There, local government insurance was confined to Folksam, all official travel was booked through RESO, which also organised conferences, with Solidar doing any catering. Private initiative by tenants in joint ownership enterprises found itself subjugated to HSB or the Riksborgen monopoly for any maintenance or renovation work. The largest building project in Malmö's history, the so-called Triangle Project, a white elephant unwanted by much of the populace but commissioned by the SDAP council, was designed by Riksborgen's architectural office to include a hypermarket run by Solidar, whose present supermarket was to be rented from them by the Council (for what purpose is unclear). BPA, the contractors who

lost vast sums in Saudi Arabia by quoting ridiculously low in order to get work there (having to be bailed out at the taxpayers' expense by Mr Palme himself), cornered the Town Hall project in Malmö; the project was divided into three stages, and again by bidding low BPA ensured acceptance of their tender for the first stage; no tenders were invited for stages two and three, which were merely awarded to BPA, presumably on a cost plus basis. Perhaps the neatest example of how the machinery worked was the interplay between the Tenants' Association and the City Housing Department (i.e., landlords to much of the Malmö population); any participation by tenants in the decision making process is monopolised by the Tenants' Association which goes through the motions of safeguarding tenant interests; in Malmö, its Chairman, Mr Hans Rode, used to take up matters requiring action with Mr Hans Rode, the City Housing Officer. Smoother meshing would be hard to find — Peachum and MacHeath themselves could hardly have done better.

A seemingly impregnable SDAP bastion for 66 years, the Malmö arrangement was now disrupted by the intrusion upon the scene of the apparently maverick Scanian Party. Though it remains to be seen how well the Scanian Party manage their first term of office in collaboration with the Moderates, such a turn of events was an encouraging sign of a decided shift in SDAP predominance that was echoed in other parts of the country, particularly Stockholm, where SDAP support has sunk from 42.5 to 35.6%.

Thus, though the SDAP retained power, its basis is no longer as secure as it formerly was, and the clear victors in the election were the Liberals under Mr Westerberg, unfortunately at the expense of other non-socialist parties rather than of the SDAP. The other parties all had their explanations for the Liberals' success, all of which ignored the fact that it had largely been due to Mr Westerberg personally, who came across to the electorate as Mr Clean (and who was dubbed by the press 'every Swedish mother-in-law's dream'). The situation at the onset of the new SDAP term of office, then, was that of a government party dependent for its majority upon the VPK, marred by an increasingly articulate malcontent faction within its own ranks, and led by a chairman whose popularity was dwindling in opinion polls, opposing them, the non-socialist parties, though they differed in certain particulars, were slowly becoming more aligned in general, and predominant among them was an invigorated Liberal Party, headed by a chairman whose popularity was soaring in opinion polls.

Then, on Friday, the 28th of February, came the brutal murder of Mr Palme. The shock of the event, and sheer disbelief that anyone could possibly imagine anything at all was to be gained by it, confused everyone's thinking; soon Mr Palme was being equated with Martin Luther King, J. F. Kennedy, Gandhi . . .; and by far the most balanced view, either in Swedish or overseas press notices, appeared in the *Daily Telegraph* editorial the following Monday. As far as Swedish internal politics was concerned, it seemed ironic that, not only was Mr Palme's

star decidedly on the wane, but growing unrest in his own party rendered schism a not entirely unbelievable eventuality. At one stroke this was changed, the SDAP would probably close ranks again, and Mr Palme would doubtless be cast in bronze as a unifying symbol.

It is too early for a definitive assessment of Mr Palme or his significance in Swedish politics, as was pointed by the Riksdag librarian when, after the murder, he banned from the library a critical review (*Who is Olof Palme?*) by the late Mr Bertil Ostergren. Among other things, Mr Ostergren, who had known Mr Palme since they were both active in the Swedish Student Union, tried to clarify the sequence of events that resulted in the metamorphosis into a dedicated socialist of a reservist cavalry officer of patrician stock and highly privileged circumstances, a vociferous anti-communist who had scathingly denounced the International Union of Students for becoming a Soviet mouthpiece, a man with a post in Military Intelligence, and a contributor to *the* right wing Swedish newspaper (*Svenska Dagbladet*) of vitriolic articles dripping with haughty derision of every manifestation of plebeian culture. For Mr Palme had stepped from outside the SDAP to the very apex of its hierarchy when he obtained an appointment as personal secretary to its previous chairman, Mr Tage Erlander.

Though such an interpretation would be hotly contested by SDAP sympathisers, the impartial mind has difficulty in seeing the transformation as reflecting anything other than blatant political opportunism. Mr Palme's instinct for an effective rôle was sure (even in the Student Union he had never gone through the ranks, but straight to the top); when he entered politics in the early 'fifties the non-socialist parties can have held out little opportunity for the exercise of his talents, and he was far too shrewd to waste himself in what would largely have been limited to impotent skirmishing from without, his sarcasm and sharp tongue would undoubtedly have made an immediate impact, but to little avail.

To acknowledge Mr Palme's political acumen is not to credit him with a mastery of events, but with a keen nose for the opportunity offering the best return. Like all demagogues, he knew people to be less open to persuasion by logic or ideological argument than by emotional appeal, a challenge to which his not inconsiderable histrionic talent and skill with words were usually more than equal. So great was his confidence in his own powers, however, and so monumental his disdain of divergent opinion, that he tended to be careless with his image. Though Swedish State TV has been of immense service to the SDAP, the medium tends to be a two-edged sword; however mesmerised by the medium into swallowing the message viewers may be, the accumulation of *non sequiturs*, U-turns and deliberate distortions is bound to have an effect in the long run. Foreign observers, amazed at the gullibility of the Swedish electorate in swallowing patent examples of what Winston Churchill once referred to as 'terminological inexactitude', often tended to feel that Sweden had got the Palme it deserved.

The new premier, Mr Ingvar Carlsson, presents a very different, and

quite uncontroversial image; he is a Swede of a type that his countrymen readily recognise and feel at home with, and his popularity has already outpaced even Mr Westerberg's, which is still on the increase, however. In the aftermath of the Palme murder, SDAP popularity surged briefly and there were more than the usual number of applications for party membership, but this was probably only a transient phenomenon, having its origins in emotion rather than conviction. If the police continue to be as ineffectual in solving the Palme murder as they have been (up to the time of writing), we are unlikely ever to know why on earth it happened; but if the Liberals can build upon their recent election success, and consolidate their cooperation with the other non-socialist parties, and if Mr Westerberg keeps his image bright and shining, perhaps it may turn out to have been the finger of fate, and that Sweden had simply had all it ever needed of Big Brother.

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CHILDBIRTH IN 1986

by Dame Josephine Barnes

CHILDBIRTH and the care of women during pregnancy and birth has always been the subject of controversy, and no less than today. In the 18th century controversy arose when the 'man-midwives' were alleged to usurp the rights of the women who, traditionally and over the centuries, had cared for women in childbirth. At the beginning of the 20th century childbirth was a hazardous business for mother and child. Mothers lost their lives or were seriously injured. There was little reliable pain relief and Caesarian section, now so readily performed, carried a high death rate. Out of every thousand babies born something in the order of 200 would not survive their first year of life. There was no organised maternity service — though the Royal College of Midwives had been founded in 1881 and the midwifery profession was established by the Midwives Act of 1902. This means that only a registered medical practitioner or a state certified midwife may legally practise midwifery. Maternity hospitals were usually located in large cities and served mainly the poor. Most babies were born in their own homes with the aid of a midwife and the family doctor, the traditional handywoman, untrained but with some native skills existed for the least affluent, unable to afford the services of a doctor or midwife. These handywomen still existed in the 1930s and were preferred by the poorest, who felt perhaps more at ease with them than with the professionals.

The idea of medical supervision for pregnant women developed in the first decade of this century, notably with J. W. Ballantyne in Edinburgh. He was interested in abnormalities of the unborn child and planned to prevent them by prenatal care of the mother. His first patients were unmarried mothers in a pre-maternity 'rescue home', but the results were so impressive that medical supervision was offered to married mothers as well. This led to the development in England of services, largely based on local authorities, for Maternity and Child Welfare, although it was not until 1936 that the Midwives Act set up a countrywide service of local authority midwives. Concern at the state of affairs led to two events.

In 1928 the National Birthday Trust Fund was founded by Lady George Cholmondeley and Lady Baldwin, the wife of the Prime Minister. This was a charity founded with the object of extending and improving maternity services. In 1929 the British College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, now the Royal College, was founded by Sir William Blair Bell of Liverpool and Sir William Fletcher Shaw of Manchester, thus establishing the speciality as separate from medicine and from surgery.

By 1930 the modern age of the application of scientific and clinical research to childbearing may be said to have begun. Professorial Chairs in Obstetrics and Gynaecology were established in London at the Royal

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Free Hospital and at University College Hospital, in addition to the existing chairs elsewhere in the country. There were many problems to solve. There was still the ever-present menace of puerperal infection, the dreaded childbed fever. This was not to be fully overcome until the full development of antibiotics. Toxaemia of pregnancy was another menace. Here the mother suffers high blood pressure, swelling and eventually the kidneys become involved; she may then suffer from eclampsia (Greek 'flash of light') when epileptic-type fits develop, this condition is highly dangerous to mother and baby. Another complication of toxæmia may be bleeding from separation of the placenta or afterbirth, this may lead to the death of the baby and the mother may also die from bleeding or kidney failure. The measures available for the control of bleeding after delivery were primitive and unreliable.

Measures for the relief of pain in childbirth were still unsatisfactory, mothers delivering at home might well get no relief at all. There was a fashion for 'twilight sleep' when the mother was given opiates so as to render her semiconscious. This was dangerous for the baby and methods for resuscitation were still inadequate. Dr Minnitt, a practitioner in North London, introduced a machine by which the mother could deliver to herself a mixture of nitrous oxide 'laughing gas' and air. This has since been superseded by gas and oxygen. Some important developments were to follow. A young obstetrician, John Chassar Moir, working with Professor F. J. Browne at University College Hospital in London, isolated ergometrine. This is an important ingredient of ergot, a fungus of rye much used in the treatment of bleeding after birth. Until then the effects had been erratic and overdosage dangerous, so the discovery of a safe and reliable drug was a considerable advance. Also in the 1930's there was a dramatic drop in maternal deaths. This was in large measure due to the reduction of cases of infection. This in turn was due to the appearance on the scene of the sulphonamides, first discovered in Germany, and the beginning of really effective treatment for infections. Penicillin and the other antibiotics were to follow in the next decade. This decade also saw the development of antenatal care as it is practised today. It seems strange now that over the centuries so much attention was paid to the act of childbirth and the lying-in period and so little to the nine months which preceded them. At about this time a new personality appeared on the scene. Grantley Dick Read brought a new dimension to child bearing with ideas that the pain of labour may be due to fear and tension. Preparation for labour by exercise and relaxation could make all the difference. His ideas were taken up by many, not least the physiotherapist Helen Heardman, who made an important contribution.

During the war maternity services were sustained, though to some extent disorganised, but the Emergency Medical Service was the forerunner of the National Health Service to come in 1948. An important study of the social aspects of child bearing was carried out by James Douglas in 1946 and published as *Maternity in Great Britain*. This was a survey based on every birth that took place in one week. It provided

a vast amount of information, in particular regarding the care women received in pregnancy and labour and the costs of having a baby. Then, the majority of babies were born at home as distinct from the modern scene when most are born in hospital. This study also provided a cohort of infants to be followed up indefinitely. From now on there were to be many advances. The Blood Transfusion Service was to save the lives of many mothers and babies. In relation to this the Obstetric Flying Squads, set up all over the country, brought emergency help to women in their own homes. The discovery of the Rhesus factor, leading to serious anaemia and jaundice in the newborn baby, made it possible to treat and to save many of these children. The advent of the National Health Service in 1948 provided a really comprehensive maternity service and the opportunity to improve the lot of mothers and their babies. In the 1950's there was still concern at the death rates of mothers and their babies, and two events took place which were to have far-reaching effects. In 1952 the Department of Health set up the Confidential Enquiries into Maternal Deaths. This study continues to this day and the reports are published every 3 years by the Stationery Office. Every death of a mother in or associated with pregnancy and birth is analysed by an obstetrician, an anaesthetist and a pathologist, avoidable factors are analysed and these may be due to the doctors, midwives or the mothers themselves. These studies have provided a mass of material but the important outcome has been the improvement in services and the greater safety of mothers.

Another study of great importance was the Perinatal Mortality study of 1958, published in 1963 as *Perinatal Mortality*. This study was initiated by Professor William Nixon of University College Hospital. Perinatal mortality is the sum of those babies stillborn and those dying in the first week of life. In 1958 the figure for this country was 35 per thousand; when a league table was constructed Britain was found to be behind many other countries in this respect. This study included every birth born in one week in 1958. The result was a cohort of 18,000 children who have been followed up to this day, providing a unique study of developmental and educational matters. The perinatal survey revealed defects in services and in maternity care. In particular there was a study of births taking place at home. It was found that birth at home was safe for the baby provided it was normal, but if an abnormality arose necessitating admission to hospital then the situation was much more dangerous.

The 1960's may be defined as the decade in which technology began to be applied to child bearing and there were many advances. A young man, Ian Donald, later Professor in Glasgow, developed ultrasound as applied to pregnancy. This provided a means of studying the unborn child which is safe, compared with X-rays which may carry some risk. Ultrasound does not replace X-rays in all situations but it makes it possible to study the rate of growth of the baby, the exact expected date of delivery, certain abnormalities, the situation of the placenta or after-birth — information which was difficult or impossible to obtain by other

means Accurate methods of studying the heart beat of the unborn child were researched, and this led to the process of monitoring This may be done by an electrode applied directly to the baby's scalp, or by a transducer attached to the mother's abdomen. If the baby is suffering in the course of labour the baby can be quickly delivered On the other hand the presence of the monitor does limit the mother's freedom of movement

Anaesthetics have made great advances, no less during childbirth However there are certain dangers and the Confidential Enquiries have highlighted these The most important is that the pregnant woman given an anaesthetic may inhale stomach contents into her lungs, and this can have a serious or even fatal effect Methods of pain relief have also improved. The discovery of pethidine in the 1940s appeared to provide a safe means of pain relief, although everything given to the mother affects the baby so that excessive doses may be dangerous The Minnitt apparatus for gas and air has been replaced by a machine which provides a mixture of gas and oxygen, much safer for the baby Trilene, trichloroethylene had a vogue. Both gas and oxygen and trilene are given to the mother for self-administration, and the risk of overdosage is minimal Local anaesthetics were much improved and are used for dealing with tears which may occur, and for some operative deliveries Spinal anaesthesia had a vogue but it carries certain dangers and has now been replaced by epidural, when a local anaesthetic is injected around the nerves in the spine thus dulling sensation in the lower abdomen and pelvis. A successful epidural virtually abolishes pain in labour, but it also carries certain dangers and it must be given by an expert anaesthetist

There have been great advances in neonatal paediatrics — the care of the newborn baby The child born in 1900 was dependant for its care on the midwife and the family doctor Concern about high rates of perinatal mortality were partly responsible for the advances, but technology has added a new dimension The early apparatus was fairly primitive, consisting of incubators with oxygen and controlled temperature and humidity Now it has become possible to achieve the survival of very tiny babies, some less than 2 lbs (one kilogram) in weight Thus in the 20th century childbearing has become very safe for mothers and the survival rate of their babies has improved enormously This has created its own problem These problems are many and various and may be said to result partly from the great advances in the care of mothers and their babies which have led to greater expectations in the mind of the public The care of the newborn now requires units with high technology, and there are times when these units are fully occupied so that babies needing intensive care may have to be turned away Intensive care of the newborn requires not only technology but high levels of skilled medical and nursing staff 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and this in a time of cuts and shortages is expensive and difficult to maintain The care of mothers in pregnancy and labour is also the subject of much controversy Some feel that technological advances have made the management of mothers

artificial and that natural births are discouraged. There was a vogue in the 1970's for artificial induction of labour and for artificial management of labour. The standards of antenatal care in some hospitals have been criticised as it is felt that women are herded into crowded clinics and kept waiting for long periods, only to have a few minutes with the doctor and with little opportunity to discuss problems and fears. This in fact is almost totally unnecessary if antenatal care is shared with general practitioners and midwives.

But perhaps the matter which has given the medical profession the greatest cause for concern is the recent escalation of legal actions for negligence against doctors. Actions for negligence against doctors are dealt with by the three defence societies, the Medical Defence Union, the Medical Protection Society, and the Medical and Dental Defence Union of Scotland. These are not insurance companies but exist to protect the interest of doctors and dentists and to pay legal charges and costs incurred by them. There has been a very disquieting increase in legal costs and indemnity payments. The situation has not yet reached that of the USA where high damages have led some doctors to refuse to practise midwifery at all. It also leads to 'defensive medicine' so that if there is the slightest doubt of the outcome of childbirth the mother is submitted to Caesarian section. The rate in parts of the USA reached 26% of births so that the Federal Government was obliged to express concern. There is little prospect of defence if a baby suffers brain damage as a result of the negligence of those responsible, and perhaps the increase in these cases is a reflection on the quality of maternity care. Another factor has been the introduction of Legal Aid which provides unlimited legal services for plaintiffs.

Finally there is the on-going controversy between the advocates of modern technology and those who wish to revert to so-called natural childbirth. And so the dilemma exists between the maximum safety for mother and baby and the greatest freedom of choice for the mother. Many of the problems arise from lack of communication and in some cases an authoritarian stance by the obstetrician.

[Dame Josephine Barnes, DBE, DM, FRCP, FRCS, FRCOG, is Consulting Obstetrician and Gynaecologist at Charing Cross Hospital and Elizabeth Garrett Anderson Hospital, Vice-President of the Medical Defence Union and President of the National Birthday Trust Fund. She is a former President of the British Medical Association and former Vice-President of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists and has been a member of the Royal Commission on Medical Education, of the Committee on the Working of the Abortion Act and of the Warnock Committee on In Vitro Fertilisation and Human Embryology. Dame Josephine will contribute a second article, *Artificial Motherhood*, to be published in the December issue.]

DUBAI NOTEBOOK

by Donald Cook

THE Gold Suk in Dubai closes at eight o'clock in the evenings. Unlike the traditional Arab open market, it's a street of small shops with window-displays crammed with glittering arrays of jewels and gold adornments from delicate bracelets to full-size replicas of *kunjas* (daggers) and with scabbards in gold filigree.

There is nothing sham or shoddy in the close-packed shops, for many of the items are hand-crafted with all the skill of generations of goldsmiths. As is usual, prices are negotiated between owner and customer. The discussions are quiet and restrained, the gold articles are first weighed and compared with the day's market price before any transaction begins. As most of the gold is 18 to 22 carat it is an expensive trade, but the competition is there, and the chance that the shop next door will offer slightly better terms. Not that there are any bargains around, so it's just a matter of finding who has a slight edge.

The two hundred yard street is always crowded with people of a dozen nationalities, for Dubai's population has been swollen by expatriates from Europe, America, India, Australia and elsewhere, who not only work in oil but also in the multitude of commercial and industrial enterprises its wealth has brought. Significantly, none of the shops have security-grilles on their windows, and the solitary policeman is more concerned with keeping the traffic moving than acting as a guard. Theft is punished in the traditional manner by the Arabs and, although Westerners profess horror, Dubai is a city where people can walk after dark without fear.

Apart from gold, Dubai has always been concerned with general trade. The Creek, which runs inland from the Gulf for about three miles, made it a natural harbour and boat-building centre. The traditional wooden dhows are still built there, and continue to carry goods around the Gulf and out to India, although the once-wealthy pearl-fishing industry has virtually disappeared. Like the pirates whose activities against British merchant shipping in the 18th century first brought the Royal Navy there, all that is now part of history. Today, the Creek is full of ships loading or discharging cargoes of anything from carpets, washing-machines and timber, to television sets and hi-fi equipment. Alongside this small trade facility, a huge new harbour and dock complex has been built on the coast which is capable of taking the world's largest shipping, including the tankers.

In a climate where, to quote T.E. Lawrence, 'The heat of Arabia came out like a drawn sword and struck us speechless,' air-conditioning is a salvation. A full day's work can be done without becoming exhausted.

While the Gold Suk craftsmanship reproduces traditional Arab design, the Museum in what is left of old Dubai across the Creek contains a collection of artefacts which illustrate the history and development of the Gulf Arabs. The building used to be the local fort, a typical Beau

Geste-style structure In what were once the living-quarters, fine displays of weaponry, jewellery, silver-work, costumes, and the utilitarian pots and pans give a vivid insight into the ancient culture. The sea-faring tradition is traced with a collection of boats set out in the courtyard, so that it's possible to make a comprehensive study of all the historical aspects of Dubai life

A few paces from the fort are the few remaining old houses with their original wind-towers. These square towers built at one end, and about twice the height of the house, have louvered openings on all four sides at high level. Their purpose was to catch the breezes and conduct them via a series of baffles into the rooms to cool them. They are a remarkable architectural feature, unique to the Gulf coast, and will be preserved

A ten minutes drive from the city-centre is to leave modern technology behind and face a landscape of endless sand-dunes and bare wadis. Although in recent years a network of good roads has been constructed between the main towns, at certain points on these highways the drifting sand has to be regularly cleared. If left untouched, the desert would very slowly take back what it has lost.

To go on safari into the desert is to realise its power, and how precarious is humanity's hold on its fringes. The immensity of the landscape, and the knowledge that such terrain, save for a few oases, stretches down to Aden in the south and up to Port Said, emphasises the harshness of survival in the past and also in the present, if the Land Rover had broken down

In spite of the stifling heat, the desert has a magical quality. Along the distant horizon the mountains of Oman stretching, brown and desolate like a row of broken teeth, the tiny star-shaped flowers growing in the shadow of a rock and the three-feet-long green lizards, thicker in girth than a man's thigh, basking in the sand, are part of the fascination. The velvet quality of night under the stars seems to capture the essential romance of Arabia as depicted in ancient legend and poem; and then daylight brings again the fierce reality of the sun. With it too, comes the understanding that the people who have lived there for centuries on the edge of survival are using their new wealth to tackle the problems of irrigation and agricultural development so that future generations can benefit

Already, the new housing-schemes in Dubai have brought the Bedouin in from the desert. The older people pitched their tents outside the houses, resentful of the loss of their traditional freedom. For the young it's different. Keen for the chance to be properly educated and to enjoy the comforts of city life, they welcome the change.

Modern technology has come so quickly to Dubai, as elsewhere in the Middle East, that elements of the traditional culture have suffered, particularly in architecture.

Yet in modern Dubai it is still possible to see an Arab dignitary walking with his falcon on his wrist, to visit the exciting camel races and above all to hear the compulsive daily calls to prayer.

PLAYING POLITICAL POKER

by Paul Rose

THE pack has been reshuffled but the hand hardly deceives the eye. The two most able Tory 'Wets' have been elevated in Northern Ireland and Overseas Development where they are safely out of sight. Self-publicist Rhodes Boyson and Edwina Currie have been brought into prominence but there has been little imagination in the latest round of political musical chairs and advancement on the far right.

Judging by the media, the next Election was just on the horizon the day Mrs Thatcher gained her second term of office. Judging by her instinct for power and the continuing steady Labour lead at the polls — those taken by Marplan, Mori or Gallup — not the one that counts, it is likely that those itching for the hustings will have to wait.

David Owen thinks the Lady will cut and run and indeed if Alliance fortunes continue to slide after a year in which success at local or even national level fulfill the prophecy of power brokers as the David's new position, then she may well be tempted. However, with Unionist unrest bordering on mutiny and Scottish Nationalists breathing new life there may be more than one group sharing the ability to make and break a Government. British politics are more fragmented and electors more disenchanted than at any time. Gone are the days of the post-war era when the two Party system produced the now simplistic concept of the Swingometer.

I write as we have already entered the Conference Season and that always produces distortions, albeit usually of a temporary nature. Should the Alliance exposure reverse the downward trend or should Militant madness tarnish or improve the now statesmanlike image of Neil Kinnock, there is little likelihood that Conservatives will present anything other than an image of stability and continuity with a few dissident voices raised over South Africa, unemployment and inner city decay. Mrs Thatcher doesn't glean her votes from Soweto or Southall but rather from suburbia and shire where the competition has of recent times been with the Alliance.

Labour, standing proudly upon its forty per cent barricade has not been too badly damaged by the SDP. This party has increasingly looked like something middle-aged, middle-class and middle-road rather than reflecting the radicalism of a party committed to basic reforms in the fields of the electoral system, freedom of information and a Bill of Rights stoutly defended by Shirley Williams. Its fudging on nuclear power and defence coupled with a reasonableness in industrial relations that captivates neither Trade Unionists nor employers, combined with tensions between the two partners in the Alliance, particularly following the Liberal party's Eastbourne vote, have led to a fraying at the edges as natural Tories and Labourites slip back to old allegiances.

The balance sheet of low inflation and high unemployment, consumer-

ism and share owning satisfaction, inner city and northern decay and despair seems to cancel out. A small shift on a new issue may mean the final decision on our fate for five years. The decision on one issue rests with the dealer in this game of blind poker—when to call and see the electorate's response.

The sheer volume of news at home and abroad has, during the Parliamentary recess, tended as always to obscure Governmental problems. Westland seems worlds away. Meanwhile, the Trustee Savings Bank and British Gas floatation now to be followed by Britair have focussed the attention of the middle-class on rich pickings rather than Band Aid or Sports Aid. There is a cynicism about Party politics and a scepticism about Parties among young people for whom success or survival at a personal level have taken precedence over the idealism that led my generation into political actions in the wake of Suez and Hungary.

That idealism was tapped by Saint Bob (Bob Geldorf) and is reflected in a myriad of single issue causes but there is a distinct tendency to mistrust the machine men. It is for this reason that the lunatic left and radical right found in the Alliance an enemy they dared not recognise but which they feared. Five years on that idealism has seeped away to a large degree and it is more difficult for the electorate to identify with one party. If my own reactions are a barometer, then I find that I would have to decide upon my loyalties according to the area in which I happen to live and the nature of the Political Parties there, so different are the internal attitudes from those expressed by the PR men and the advertising agencies which put the national image across. At this moment they are all playing poker in the dark for the stakes of office and no-one knows who will hold the cards that will clear the tables of the uncashed cheques promising the electorate policies and solutions of which they are justifiably sceptical.

The big events in the world are no longer happening in our backyard. Northern Ireland looks like a punch-up compared to the growing mounds of bodies separating Iraq from Iran. The overkill of the police raid in Bristol looks like a gentle admonition compared to the gas grenades and bullets and burnings at Crossroads as the South African cauldron begins to bubble. Britain's self-isolation may well turn out to be a luxury we will regret as the tensions mount.

Beirut is a no go city. The fall out from Chernobyl has been as political as radio active with a new awareness of the potential for global suicide as the Superpowers haggle over what constitutes a spy. Tamils flee from the ravages of Sri Lanka while Pinochet narrowly misses death on the other side of our strife-torn world. Pakistan plays unwilling host to yet another hi-jack disaster while Peres and Mubarak manage a civilised discussion that offers a scintilla of hope in another cockpit of strife.

Reagan arms the Contras while human rights are obscenely dismissed in most of that polarised continent of Latin America, ready to become the focus of a decade of strife that may surpass anything the winds of

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change brought to Africa after the partition of the Indian Subcontinent. There is a hurricane off the coast of Florida fed by vast international debts and dire poverty in the shanty towns among the haciendas which has all the seeds of a conflict that will make the Spanish Civil War look like a warming up session before the giant bulls and master Matadors do battle in the blood and sawdust. The same ingredients are there — deeply woven into the fabric of Iberian politics and fuelled by factors as inflammatory as the pre-war divisions of Europe between Hitler, Stalin and the weak-kneed democracies that failed to heed the greater evil and join forces with the lesser until forced into an uncomfortable temporary embrace.

Gorbachov is not Stalin and Reagan is not Hitler but global strategy dictates actions on the part of both inimicable to the teething child of democracy in many a smaller or weaker nation trying in the only way it knows how to break the cycle of coup and counter-coup. The Sandanistas may not be a Republican Senator's bourbon and Solidarity may strike fear into the hearts of ageing Stalinists but people refuse to be suppressed whether in Soweto or Gdansk. In such a world it is difficult for the average Briton to get steamed up about even the most controversial issue unless it is on their doorstep.

Thus, nuclear waste becomes an issue when it is to be buried next door. Crime becomes an issue when it is on one's own estate. The peculiarities of the Stalker affair should shake the foundations of our perception of the repercussions of our Northern Ireland policy upon policing in Britain.

The decline in our manufacturing base should galvanise us into educating a generation of engineers, computer experts and technological whizz kids, yet we plod on with irrelevant causes. After all we have oil, even if the price has fallen dramatically. There may well be in the English subconscious a feeling that there are more important things than growth and greatness such as family and leisure, holidays by the sea, albeit polluted beyond anything we would care to believe, the DIY shop open on Sunday to buy wood and nails, gloves or fertilisers.

I wonder if I am a barometer or whether it is the attainment of an age at which English cricketers' scores are wildly applauded since centuries are rare and their scorers are rebuffed by selectors for their private misdemeanours. However, the DIY shop has replaced the Demonstration. The garden has replaced the political arena just as the latest Tandoori restaurant reflects changes that have turned insular tastes and nationalism into a multi-ethnic society not ill at ease among the smaller nations of the world. And yet, my blood pulsed as Steve Cram, Seb Coe, Fatima Whitbread, Daley Thompson, Roger Black, Errol Christie, and two black and two white athletes embraced as they brought home Gold for England. There is a streak of patriotism not borne of hatred but of pride that with all its faults, even with the Iron Lady at the helm and problems that seem insuperable, there is a reserve of vitality and basic decency that few nations can emulate and that last kick for home in the last

straight is something that runs deep in the British heritage and captivates those of whatever background who love this curious, funny, sleepy and apparently apathetic nation of ours

Just as something woke up in most of us, in a somewhat atavistic way when foreign troops marched into the meadows of the Falklands, so perhaps Blake's proverbial sword and arrows may surface when we realise the full extent of the neglect and despair that is in our midst. The inner city decay, the dirty hospital waiting room and growing queues, the classroom where few learn and fewer teach, the riot gear of our once local bobby will eventually impinge upon our consciousness. The DIY shop and the next holiday in the Greek Islands may give way to a sudden burst of resolution and anger.

Then, whoever is dealing the cards will receive a nasty shock for while the politicians play poker in the dark there are others who would pull down the walls of the Casino society. Some of it will be unpleasant but from time to time in British history we have been saved from revolution and bloodshed by an upsurge of anger and radical change which have all but destroyed outmoded institutions and paved the way to a more caring society.

From the one nation Tories to the radical but non-authoritarian left there is at this moment a feeling of helplessness but suppressed anger as Militants and right wing populists decry or sell off the nation's assets. At this time of calm, even Mr Tebbit must fear a storm.

The December issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *Liberation Movements — The Liberal Perspective* by Urs Schoettli, *And So to Vienna — The CSCE Eleven Years On* by Julian Luxmoore, *Creating the Partnership for Progress* by Paddy Ashdown, MP and *'Let Them Smash Teacups' — Weimar Ceramics 1919-1933* by Muriel Julius.

'ALL THE REALMS OF A WHISPER': THE POETRY OF SEAMUS HEANEY

by Elmer Andrews

MY title alludes to a shadowy, insubstantial influence which nevertheless haunts the poet's imagination and controls the modulations of his voice. It stands in opposition to the clamour of the public world, to literate feeling, the council of rational humanism and civilized value. It is associated with the past, with childhood, with personal cultural origins, illiterate feeling, the mind's 'secret stations' and unconscious sources of power. The sinister, lumbering approach of the armoured cars 'warbling along on powerful tyres' in 'The Toome Road', is a memorable image of the brutal, alien power which threatens to engulf the private sensibility that has been nurtured by and takes its colouring from a particular landscape, history and community. But

It stands here still, stands vibrant as you pass,

The invisible, untopped omphalos¹

Behind the voice in Heaney's work is a shadow-world from which, in the midst of terror and death and doubt, he summons energy and ancestry.

Heaney's poetry is a process of evoking the unconscious. He takes a commonplace image — a brick, a harvest bow, a mug, a sunflower, falling rain or, in the case of the poem from which my title comes, a snowshoe — and pursues it imaginatively to see where it will lead. It is a thread into the unconscious, tugged at, it brings other images in its train. The method is used to recreate his childhood and the people and things in it, each with its own function, its history, its drama, its mystery. These things come back urgent with life and meaning: because finished, they are enduring and 'perfect'. Things — always more important than ideas — are the repositories of an affection that he was too preoccupied to notice. When the veil is lifted, things have the power to evoke by shape or texture or sound or taste, a time that has been lost. He is able to live again in a new way. This is the 'philosophic mind' Wordsworth spoke of. The senses are the house of memory, sought not for its own sake but because to remember, as 'Poem' tells us, is to love. time without affection is time lost.

Language, the house of racial memory, is another of 'the realms of whisper'.

the shower
gathering in your heelmark
was the black O
in *Broagh*,
its low tattoo
among the windy boortrees
and rhubarb-blades
ended almost
suddenly, like that last
oh the strangers found
difficult to manage²

And landscape. Sensings, glimmerings, mountings reach the poet from

the hiding places amongst the whispering leaves of the trees, and the ferns and broom and catkins where he played the game of 'secrets' as a child. Strange voices of the dead, with their antediluvian lore, are heard in the sound of the rain falling and the Moyola in flood. There is a voracious concern with the sensuous textures of things in the natural world as if, by possessing completely the look and feel and sound of these things, he will divine their secret sources of power and commune with the creative principle — the life-force — that gives them their being. He seeks to restore a transcendent or sacramental dimension to life. For a while the bog which from childhood had had a 'strange, assuaging effect'³ on him is the focus for his exploration of 'the realms of whisper'. The bog 'cheeps and lisps', it is 'the vowel of the earth', and it brings him to 'the edge of the centuries' where he finds himself 'facing a goddess'.⁴ Contemplating this goddess puts the magic back in life, and also the meaning.

Adverse judgements have been made on Heaney's morbid devotion to the goddess. He has been accused of treating the denizens of her dark realm as symbols of enduring beauty and magnificence when they are, in fact, the murdered dead of a barbaric society. Critics have resented the way he seems to have turned his back on the everyday world of morality and politics to pursue a luxuriant, 'poetic' daydream. But if (as in 'Requiem for the Croppies' or 'Kinship') Heaney manages to isolate the heroic, he doesn't deny the other facts, only their power to negate the qualities of beauty and heroism. Wonder, endurance, continuance, beauty — these he offers as having something inescapably to do with life, however we may feel its terrible, deadly qualities too — the qualities which we might all too easily be persuaded to think is all there is. This is an effort to salvage a perspective which will render loss and violence less painfully overwhelming. Refusal or inability to worship, we are reminded, might be itself another kind of death.

There are key-poems (like 'Punishment') in which the re-creation of the past is a vital strategy for ordering critical reflections on the present. But even if this were not so, it might be argued that poetry need not always evaluate experience. Sometimes its main function is to extend awareness, creating new areas which the reader can assimilate into his own total morality later. The quality of violence, which Heaney explores morally in some poems, is presented in others in a manner which makes us more alive to what certain forces in Irish life really are — especially those which go into the making of a political martyr. He sees the sectarian division in Ulster as a struggle between the cults and devotees of a god and a goddess. There is the indigenous territorial human (Mother Ireland, Kathleen ni Houlihan, the poor old woman, the Shan Van Vocht) and her sovereignty has been temporarily usurped by a new male imperialist cult whose founding fathers were Cromwell, William of Orange and Edward Carson. 'This idiom', Heaney comments, 'is remote from the agnostic world of economic interest... and remote from the political manoeuvres of power-sharing, but it is not remote from the psychology of the Irishmen and Ulstermen who do the killing, and not

remote from the bankrupt psychology and mythologies implicit in the terms Irish Catholic and Ulster Protestant' ⁵

What quickly becomes the distinguishing feature of Heaney's poetry is its inwardness. When he writes about eels or the sunflower or the sound of the rain or the unmolested orchid or Sweeney raging the peaks of Ben Bolcain, his direction is inward, his concern is with 'a prospect of the mind'. This has led to another complaint, that the poetry is self-absorbed, private, difficult.

Poetry, like the novel or a painting, is often cluttered with all kinds of signals flashing and gesturing so that the artist may direct our attention to a particular response in order that his work may be made simpler for him and for us. These signals assure us of the line we have taken, confirm our grasp of the artist's drift. They make us feel safe because they make us feel we are dealing with the world we know. The danger is that these signals can swamp a poem in the banal, the formulated and the predictable. But one of the special merits of Heaney's work is the deep and subtle placing of his signals. His poems are filled with people, places, weather, animals, things, bits of conversation, presented with a concrete particularity that assures us we are here in the world we understand. But he appropriates them in a highly imaginative way, transforming them, 'perfecting' them, in his own creative alembic, as the murdered corpses were transfigured by the bog. These things must be submitted to the 'dark' before they can be 'encoded'. ⁶ They can only reveal the actual (as opposed to what is blatantly 'real') if they become the creatures of the poet's invention, not signals doing something expected, but instead allows it its head. This is Heaney's 'sad freedom'. ⁷ Consequently, his poems are rarely simple reflections of the world as a 'naturalist' might describe it or the news tells us is true. His primary obligation is not to the 'facts'. His own poetic experiment with the 'facts' in Part 2 of *North* demonstrated the resultant entrapment and thwarting of his creative powers. He seeks to compose, not a pseudo-reality, but those facts of reality that bring what we do not know — or do not want to know — about ourselves to light.

At the same time, if Heaney's poetic world is not photographic reality, it does not lack any of the solidity or texture of that reality. Many of the early poems are, in fact, so densely textured that the relentless, physical impact of the language impedes it from being the sounding rod or conductor that he wants it to be. Because of his devotion to sense-perception of the physical world, he cannot fully encompass the whisperings of other voices from realms of consciousness at the outback of the mind. The very richness and denseness of the language prevent it from achieving the translucent quality that allows the private to pass in to the public, the invisible to penetrate the visible, the past to pervade the present, as a natural effulgence. This is part of the problem with his bog poems, where he relies on a prefabricated myth to alert us to the other dimensions of reality, rather than the music of his verse. The bog poems are still thick and dense (though the artesian quatrain was a stylistic move

towards greater penetration and suggestiveness) rooted in the intractable earth But all the time there is the search for a poetry of flexible, delicate 'soundings', a poetry composed out of a self-engendering, self-delighting musical system that would be the proper expression of the poet's inner freedom

Our bodies are the temples
of the Holy Ghost Remember?
And the little, fitted, deep-slit drapes
on and off the holy vessels
regularly? And the chasuble
so deftly hoisted? But vest yourself
in the word you taught me
and the stuff I love slub silk⁸

These lines from Heaney's latest volume display his much-praised ability to render experience directly and sensuously We are invited to enjoy the sound and texture of 'slub silk' We share the sensation of the poet's delight in the actual phonetic reality of the words But what distinguishes this from early work is the co-operation of the poet's auditory imagination with the unharnessed intelligence his whole creative being is involved in the subtle handling of the poem's ecclesiastical and erotic contexts, reverberating tellingly against each other

Throughout the process of refining and clarifying his poetic voice, making it exploratory and tentative, he never allows his signals to become all — that is, symbols He does not exploit that crude response which makes us think we are learning something because we are 'seeing beneath the surface of things', when we are really seeing nothing at all He is careful to make sure his poems work on a primary, nonsymbolic level The symbols function secondarily The 'realms of whisper' are made palpably true in word and syllable and rhythm The poetry is rarely inert. Herein lies the great example of Dante With his sequence of poems set on Station Island ('a purgatorio in itself') in mind, Heaney explains Dante's exemplary force

The way in which Dante could place himself in an historical world yet submit that world to scrutiny from a perspective beyond history, the way he could accommodate the political and the transcendent, this too encouraged my attempt at a sequence of poems which would explore the typical strains which the consciousness labours under in this country The main tension is between two often contradictory commands to be faithful to the collective historical experience and to be true to the recognitions of the emerging self. I hoped that I could dramatize these strains by meeting shades from my own dream-life who had been inhabitants of the actual Irish world They could perhaps voice the claims of orthodoxy and the necessity to refuse those claims⁹

And so, in Heaney's poetry, we have a language that is constantly escaping the local historical moment and the claims of orthodoxy, carrying us away from what is contingent, as it becomes the voice of the contemplative mind, the larynx of the dark wood, the vehicle of the purely creative, intimate experimental act of writing itself

It is, finally, because of the aural allusion and character of my title phrase, 'All the realms of whisper', that it seems to me such a felicitous expression to describe the poet's secret sources of creativity — his essentially 'auditory imagination' With the grand, cavernous sound produced by the long vowels and the 'l's' and 'r's' we have the womb-like mystery,

closed by the resonating 'm'; this slides easily, by way of the plural phoneme, into the hushed and sibilant crepitation of the last word — the tensely onomatopaeic re-creation of the mystery finding utterance. This movement is repeated in the semantic progression from absolute abstraction ('all') to sensuous particularity, the word 'whisper' — a miniature of Heaney's mature 'tentative art'¹⁰ — actually defining and projecting the manner in which the mystery makes itself accessible. It is Heaney's attentiveness to these hypnotic, venturesome urgencies that gives his poetry its distinctive 'mouth-music'. Ultimately, they are the great enabling influence out of which he creates the ideal melody which transcends the world of sensual music, and delivers what Sir Philip Sidney called 'a golden world' out of the 'brazen world' of nature.

NOTES

1. 'The Toome Road,' *Field Work*, Faber & Faber, 1979
 2. 'Broagh,' *Wintering Out*, Faber & Faber, 1972.
 3. 'Feeling into Words,' *Preoccupations: Selected Prose 1968-1978*, Faber & Faber, 1980, p. 54
 4. These phrases are from 'Kinship,' *North*, Faber & Faber, 1975
 5. 'Feeling into Words,' *Preoccupations*, p. 57
 6. See 'The Peninsula,' *Door into the Dark*, Faber & Faber, 1972
 7. The phrase is from 'The Tollund Man,' *Wintering Out*
 8. 'La Toilette,' *Station Island*, Faber & Faber, 1984
 9. 'Envies and Identifications: Dante and the Modern Poet,' in *The Irish University Review* (Spring 1985), pp. 18-19
 10. The phrase is from 'Casualty,' *Field Work*
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HAS HISTORY A FUTURE?

by Peter J. Beck

FOR most people the health of any academic discipline is measured largely by its existing position in schools, polytechnics and universities, since this indicates not only the subject's intellectual strength in respect to teaching and research but also its perceived significance in the eyes of both public policy and private imaginations.

Over a long period History has occupied a central position in the Humanities on account of not only its intrinsic merits in providing an informed study of the past, and particularly of the evolutionary, and occasionally revolutionary, development of the modern world, but also its ability to illuminate and enrich other subjects within and beyond the Humanities. However, recently, the centrality of History has been challenged in the wake of changing views regarding the nature and purpose of higher education, as evidenced by the emergence of a more technological emphasis in the educational curriculum. A range of evidence has encouraged perceptions of a potential crisis in the subject, and recent months have been characterised by increased public debate upon the matter, such as demonstrated by studies in *The Times* and *Guardian* during January 1986; in fact, on 18 January the *Guardian* felt that the situation was sufficiently serious to warrant an editorial comment on the debate.

One factor prompting references to a crisis in History has been the evidence indicating a marked decline in the number of school pupils studying the subject beyond the age of 14 years, a situation both caused and exacerbated by the manner in which other subjects have been presented as more 'relevant' to today's technological society as well as by the tendency to subsume History's identity within some integrated humanities or social sciences course. This trend has excited fears that British youth lack any real interest in or commitment to the past either at school or at leisure, especially on account of their apparent preference for fantasy and science fiction stories, films and television programmes set in some future age. Inevitably, the past decade has witnessed a decline in History's position in the league table for GCE Advanced Level entrants, and its fall from third to ninth place possesses unwelcome future implications for both the number and quality of those pursuing the subject at degree level, even if universities and polytechnics are finding still that demand is quite buoyant from well-qualified applicants. In addition, History has suffered more than its fair share of the fiscal, staffing, library and other cuts characteristic of British higher education since the late 1970s; thus, there have occurred significant reductions in student intake and staffing levels, while research has been hampered by the lack of grants and by the enhanced teaching burdens placed on academic staff.

A further area of weakness concerns the repeated allegations about History's lack of utility in the job market, since changing circumstances have transformed the perceived vocational irrelevance of academic degrees

from an educational virtue to a vice. At one time, the 'ivory tower' image of the discipline was presented as a source of pride, and traditionally those involved in higher education have preferred to concentrate upon the intrinsic academic merits of History degrees, and even to rejoice in the 'ivory tower' image of their subject. However, the current political and economic context — for instance, the high rate of unemployment, including problems in the graduate job market, has fostered greater attention upon the needs of the market-place, and particularly upon the employability of graduates — renders it difficult for any subject to escape evaluation alongside the criteria of vocational relevance.

Against this background historians, having withdrawn in many cases to the academic closet and kept their distance from society, have been forced to re-appraise their position, and to consider stepping out into the market-place. For many historians, the 'ivory tower' remains still the reassuring reality, but this attitude, indeed inertia, is being challenged from several directions — from a government wanting to make education more relevant to 'perceived national needs', from employers seeking more suitable recruits, and from students anxious not to swell the ranks of the unemployed. The implication that a History degree possesses no real employment value has been utilised in turn to justify reductions in the subject's claim to resources in higher education, since recent constraints on funding have meant that so-called 'thrust' areas in computing and the sciences could be expanded only at the expense of other subject areas. In this climate History has proved extremely vulnerable, a situation accentuated by unsympathetic public perceptions of the subject, as evidenced by a *Daily Express* editorial in July 1980, when it was quoted also on BBC Radio, thus, the editorial, having complained about a range of inadequacies in the British education system, claimed that 'the end result has been that we produce far too many historians and not enough engineers, with considerable loss and harm to industry and the economy'. The suggestion that History made a negative contribution to national needs served not only to harm the subject's popular image but also to exert a damaging political impact at a time when the government was attempting to identify educational areas for contraction.

Therefore, the Robbins Report days of the 1960s, when the primary concern of higher education was to satisfy the educational aspirations of increasing numbers of students, have become a distant dream. At the present time, accountability has emerged as the name of the game, and the historian should heed the warning delivered in 1979 by the late Professor Geoffrey Barraclough of Brandeis University that he is not excluded from proving 'a positive return' from society's investment in the History industry.

In the long run, he will be judged — and history will be judged with him — by the contribution he makes in using his knowledge of the past for the shaping of the future.

The recent decline in the significance of History, especially as perceived by non-historians, raises a number of questions. Was Henry Ford — he uttered the infamous 'History is bunk' remark — right after all? Does

History have any meaningful role in a world moving rapidly towards the 21st century? Is History in retreat, and engaged merely in a rearguard action in a less historically-minded society? And is society cutting itself off from its roots? Obviously, there is no simple answer, if indeed there exists any satisfactory answer, to these questions, but the recent debate about the subject has tended to illuminate not only the difficulties but also the strengths, which can serve as a response to the critics. Significantly, the early 1980s even witnessed the establishment of the History at the Universities Defence Group, which has attempted to protect the subject's interests in the ever-changing higher education world, and particularly to promote a wider appreciation of the need to preserve History teaching and research. In addition, during May 1985 and January 1986 Lord Blake, in association with the Historical Association, organised well-publicised conferences at the House of Lords in order to highlight History's current problems and future possibilities.

The ever-widening area of debate brought about the involvement of Sir Keith Joseph, then the Secretary of State for Education and Science, who delivered a 'Why Teach History' lecture on 10 February 1984. In the event, he came out strongly in favour of History's 'essential' and 'unique contribution' to the educational curriculum on account of not only the critical, analytical and reasoning skills cultivated through its study but also the subject's role in the 'development of the shared values which are a distinguishing feature of British society and culture and which continue to shape private attitudes and public policy'. This 'heritage' concept followed on naturally from Sir Keith's parliamentary statement made on 5 July 1983.

Ministers have simply said that one of the aims of the history syllabus is to transmit an understanding and knowledge of British cultural, social, political and economic history.

Although some historians have queried certain aspects of Sir Keith's concept of their subject — this is often regarded as somewhat narrow and traditionalist — and have claimed that his department could have done more in practice to promote and protect History in schools and colleges — for example, in October 1985 Lord Blake led a delegation designed to acquaint Sir Keith with the anxieties of the historical profession — it is of interest to note such clear official perceptions of the subject's utility, and particularly of its claims to a place in the school curriculum alongside the three 'Rs'.

When discussing the contemporary utility of History in Britain, it is worth noting recent developments in the USA, where a number of corporations have either established archives or appointed professional historians on account of a growing appreciation of the strategic information to be derived from what might be called a corporate memory. Staff mobility means that such memories have tended to be short, and the archives and historians were designed to guarantee both the continuity and the quality of corporate memories. For example, historical analogies, if used prudently and cautiously, *may* help planners clarify the issues in a

complex situation and provide also a wider perspective for current problems. Ernest Arbuckle, a former chairman of Wells Fargo and Company, has recalled that board meetings often referred to previous questions of a similar nature; thus, 'we knew the answer was out there somewhere, but couldn't lay our hands on it'. During the mid-1970s this resulted in the formation of a twelve person History section to administer the archives and to provide planning reports, since the manner in which past strategies were selected, implemented and worked was deemed to provide an invaluable input for the strategic planning process. Harold Anderson, who is employed currently as a historian at Wells Fargo, has pointed out that 'the company wished to protect the integrity of its name, its history... and to employ its historical records for legal, operational, planning, marketing and public relations purposes'.

Obviously, only a limited number of American corporations have 'employed' the historical dimension in this manner, but a range of examples can be quoted, including Chase Manhattan Bank, Citibank, Coca Cola and Nabisco. Also the contribution of History to corporate operations should be kept in perspective, and Robert W. Pomeroy of the Inter-American Development Bank has reminded us that History 'improves the process. It provides valuable insights. But management will have to keep making decisions'. Although some British companies have moved along this track already in order to establish archives (eg. British Petroleum) or to commission company histories, the American example offers one possible way forward for History in British commerce and industry.

In public life History has contributed always, and contributes still, to British government policy-making, as highlighted not only by the historical insights revealed in official archives released under the thirty-year rule but also by the existence of posts like that of Historical Adviser at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. History is utilised to guide and instruct policy-makers as well as to justify the adoption of policy; for instance, in 1956 Anthony Eden, the Prime Minister, developed his policy towards President Nasser of Egypt partly in the context of historical parallels drawn from the late 1930s — Nasser was interpreted as another Hitler who had to be stopped, not appeased — while more recently, during the 1982 Falklands War, the Thatcher government employed History to strengthen the rationale for the despatch of the Task Force.

It proves difficult to understand either the nature of the Anglo-Argentine dispute over the Falkland Islands or the future prospects for a negotiated solution without an appreciation of the historical perspective; thus, Argentina and Britain are both divided — they possess rival versions of the Falklands past — and imprisoned by History, which limits their respective flexibility in negotiation.

Although such examples do not place History in the realms of a policy-making science, they do highlight the manner in which the subject can be used to illustrate how the present situation has developed as well as to provide insights for the future. Possibly, one should recall the comment of George Santayana, the Spanish-born American philosopher, to the

effect that 'those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it'. But care is required, as the events in the 1956 Suez Affair showed, and Professor Ernest May of Harvard University, where he teaches a course on the *Uses of History*, has stressed that 'it is just as important for policy-makers to know of the differences between good and bad historical analogies as it is to know the difference between good and bad statistics'. 'Bad' history tends to be regarded as something synonymous with mythology and propaganda, and particularly as a product of the functional use of History.

Traditionally, there has been a tendency to treat the past as functional, thereby providing a central and essential role for the Historian. During the 19th and 20th centuries national histories served as an important instrument for the emergence and development of a national consciousness in countries like Germany, Italy, Poland and those in the Balkans, where History, as society's memory, was considered, and still is, an integral component of national identity. The functional past continues to perform a major role in other areas, and in Soviet bloc countries History is written and re-written for political and ideological purposes. In a recent study published in December 1985 Kestutis Girnius illustrated the manner in which:

The Soviet regime invokes history to justify its legitimacy and to offer assurance of its ultimate and universal triumph and to further the integration of non-Russians into the Soviet Empire by inculcating Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism.

In Soviet histories ideology and reality merge into a single whole in order to interpret socialism as the logical outcome of a History written under the control of the Communist Party and from the point of view of an inevitably victorious socialism. Similarly, in the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran founded by Ayatollah Khomeini the period since 1979 has been characterised by a systematic re-writing, or rather Islamification, of the country's History in order to stress the centrality of religion; thus, 'Islamic' has replaced 'Iranian' and every effort has been made to highlight the failures of the deposed rulers.

The functionalist use of the past renders it difficult to distinguish historical fact from fiction, or to separate history from propaganda. Of course, no country's history can be investigated adequately without due regard to the role of mythology and fabrication, that is, without considering what Eric Hobsbawm has described as 'the invention of tradition'. In fact, recently he edited a book with this title in order to illuminate the way in which a range of apparently ancient, national traditions rely heavily upon fabrication rather than historical evidence; thus, Hugh Trevor Roper's chapter pointed to the recent 'retrospective invention' of many Scottish traditions (eg the tartans) and Prys Morgan argued that Welsh traditions involved 'a great deal of invention' by writers, since 'where those traditions were inadequate, they created a past which had never existed'.

The above-mentioned examples highlight the abuse and exploitation of history implicit in the functional use of the past, or at least in certain manifestations of this functional role. It needs to be remembered that all

societies make substantial demands upon History, which becomes 'functional' in the sense that it helps any society to know itself and to understand its relationship with both the past and other societies. *The Guardian* emphasised this point in its editorial on 18 January 1986:

Its (History) direct relevance becomes obvious on a moment's reflection; no child who has studied British history properly needs to ask why there are ethnic minorities here, why our institutions are as they are or why we are in the European Community, NATO and the Commonwealth.

To imagine any society without History is to imagine ourselves without our own memories, past experiences, and even mythologies. If any society loses its sense of the past, then it risks the loss of its faith in the future, since History serves as the record not only of the accumulated crimes and follies perpetrated by mankind but also of Man's achievements and ability either to resolve problems or at least to muddle through, thereby providing relevant parables and messages for our own age, and perhaps offering reassurance and encouragement even to a generation threatened by a nuclear holocaust. History offers a sense of perspective for the present world, which should be interpreted as merely part of a continuum extending both backwards and forwards. It is scarcely surprising that society makes considerable demands upon History for guidance, instruction and inspiration, as evidenced in February 1985 by the strong appeal made to the past by President Reagan during the course of his State of the Union message. He referred to the USA's resumption of 'its historical role as the leader of the free world'.

Tonight I have spoken of great plans and great dreams. They are dreams we can make come true. Two hundred years of American history have taught us that nothing is impossible . . . History is asking us once again to be a force for good in the world.

Such is the perceived inspirational power of History.

Naturally, many people might take exception to Reagan's view of History, but this point imposes a burden upon the Historian to distinguish the real from the invented past, since a historical training provides an apprenticeship in criticism, promotes the sense of detachment and distance needed to interpret events in a reasoned and objective manner, and fosters the capability to resist indoctrination and propaganda. Perhaps the greatest compliment to the subject was offered in 1956 by Nikita Khrushchev, who observed that 'historians are dangerous, and capable of turning everything topsy-turvy. They have to be watched'. Presumably, Norman Davies — in 1984 his book entitled *Heart of Europe* stressed the strong anti-Russian element of Polish history and confronted recent Soviet and Polish historiography — is among those being 'watched'. History's role as a liberal and humane discipline is to provide — to quote Professor Geoffrey Elton — that 'element of scepticism required to ensure the liberty of the mind and the body'. The responsibility of the Historian lies in the exposure of untruths and invention, the constructive criticism of the moral and intellectual life of society, and the promotion of an informed version of the real past. This recalls the comment of Professor David Resnick of Pittsburgh's Carnegie-Mellon University that 'the best historians have always been concerned about the quality of life in the

future', as evidenced by the concern articulated by Thucydides in *The History of the Peloponnesian War* about the decline of political leadership in Athens.

During recent debates about the state of the subject doubts have been expressed about the employment value of a History degree. In practice, the facts about the graduate job market encourage the view that a History degree should be interpreted not as an academic dead-end — this is an impression created about the subject in some quarters — but rather as an academic springboard for various areas of employment. Statistical evidence establishes that History graduates find work in a wide and often surprising range of occupations, quite apart from the more obvious areas like teaching, the civil service and publishing. The figures highlight the positive contribution made by such graduates to all sectors of the economy; thus, during 1983-84 more history graduates entered financial work (18.4% of those entering work and training) than teaching (16.6%). From the point of view of employers, what is important is the student's experience of both the subject and the process of higher education, since History degree courses provide not only the opportunity to understand the past and the development of the modern world but also a valuable training in the skills of research, assimilation, comprehension, analysis, interpretation and communication.

At present, History faces an uncertain future. There is evidence of weakness, but this aspect is counterbalanced by numerous signs of strength and vitality, as highlighted by the popular appeal of the monthly periodical, *History Today*, and of the television programme, *Timewatch*. Perhaps, 'going forward with History' should become society's motto, thereby establishing that History has a future not only during the late 1980s but also in the 21st century.

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MAGGIO MUSICALE IN FLORENCE 1986 AND SVIATOSLAV RICHTER IN VENICE

by Peter Orr

THE 49th Maggio Musicale Fiorentino, spread over two months, contained any number of enticing events. Luciano Berio, conducting his own opera, *La vera storia*, the festival's artistic director, Zubin Mehta, conducting *Tosea* (with Jonathan Miller producing), *Meistersinger* and a Bruckner concert with the Israel Philharmonic; recitals by Lucia Popp, Bernd Weikl, Hermann Prey, Ravi Shankar, Yehudi Menuhin and Pinchas Zukerman; chamber music and ballet. The Polish composer Krzysztof Penderecki conducted the Orchestra del Maggio Musicale Fiorentino in a concert of his own works. The setting was a magnificent one: the Salone dei Cinquecento in Florence's Palazzo Vecchio. Penderecki's music is full of character — often aggressive, sometimes even strident in its climaxes, it explores and exploits the range of sonorities to be won from a large orchestra. Notable in that respect was his first symphony, the final item in the evening's programme, which developed from a startling succession of percussive cracks at the opening, into a veritable turmoil of sound, when the density of texture at full fortissimo turned towards coarseness because of the inability of the Salone to handle such volume of sound. A piano was employed, not as a solo instrument, but as part of the orchestral forces, and did double duty as the player used the keyboard at one moment, and the next found him striking the open strings. Throughout the piece, the listener was constantly reminded that sonority was the principal factor in determining the direction the music was to take: the use of glissando, frequent repetition of key phrases, a striking piece of musical onomatopoeia — by such means, altogether characteristic, does Penderecki shape his symphony, which had its first performance in Peterborough Cathedral, with the London Symphony Orchestra, in 1973.

De natura sonoris II, which opened the programme, belongs to 1971 and is, as its title indicates, again concerned with the bold exploration of sonorities. The centrepiece of the evening, in more ways than one, was Penderecki's Viola Concerto, in which Grigori Szytlin was the brilliant and sensitive soloist, apparently quite undismayed by the formidable technical demands of the piece. Written in 1983, the concerto is an immediately attractive piece, with a striking clarity of structure. It is cast in a single movement, within which are contained contrasting sections. The slow opening passage is reflected by another of that same tempo which brings the work to its close. It was in this music that conductor, soloist and orchestra provided the fullest eloquence of the evening.

In the smaller auditorium at the Teatro Comunale, Florence's opera house in the Corso Italia, the Ballet Théâtre L'Ensemble offered an exciting and varied assemblage of dance and mime, in a programme entitled *Cascade*. The company, consisting in this instance of a dozen young

dancers, came together first in Brussels some five years ago, under their director and choreographer Micha van Hoecke, himself a former member of the now-legendary Roland Petit ballet. In Florence, they gave an exuberant display, technically brilliant, on a bare stage where light, colour, movement and a most inventive sound-track achieved a series of astonishing effects. In keeping with the title of the ballet, *Cascade*, images of water were frequently presented, even to the extent of having a slender, glittering cascade descend from the height of the proscenium; and the finale brought on to the stage an elaborate transparent construction of bubbling water-courses. The music was from several hands, mostly contemporary, but including a contribution from Jacques Offenbach, as well as a pop song. The stage pictures, movement and grouping, costumes and occasionally projected images, were constantly changing from one delightful pattern to the next, as the ballet (played continuously, with no intermission) worked its way through a succession of vivid episodes, among them 'La madre', 'I bambini', 'Il circo' (this circus scene was notable for its vitality and versatility, which included an impressive demonstration of fire-eating), 'L'oiseau', and the closing 'Cascade' to music by Steve Reich. An evening of rare invention, presented by a hugely-talented, disciplined and athletic company, whom it is a pleasure to salute.

While high jinks were in order at the Maggio Musicale in Florence, musical life in Venice proceeded along more sedate lines. In fact, only by chance one day did I happen to catch sight of a poster announcing that Richter was due to play that very evening. However, when I arrived at the theatre, every seat was sold, and a kindly attendant yielded to me possession of his bench. Obviously, the musical *cognoscenti* in that city really do know what is going on. La Fenice must be one of the most elegant opera houses in the world: gold and pink enhance the gentle, curving shapes of the tiered boxes and the auditorium is filled with the scent of rose petals. For this recital, the piano was placed in front of the lowered curtain, with spotlights illuminating the keyboard and little else besides. It was as though we were all present at a rather private occasion. Sviatoslav Richter is, without doubt, one of the pianistic giants of our age, and in a programme of music by Haydn and Chopin he displayed all those touches so familiar to his admirers over the years: phenomenal control of dynamics, precision of articulation, and a studious avoidance of histrionic gesture. At times he gives the impression of being almost unaware of the presence of an audience, so intent is he on finding his own way to the core of the music. In the Haydn sonata, there was a certain coolness not inappropriate to the piece, technically, it was an amazing performance. The Chopin Ballades, which followed the interval, were presented with a deliberate denial of sentimentality, in an interpretation which was utterly individual, an attempt to distil the very essence of the music, not just its incidental hues and perfumes. It was an evening of distinctive musical character despite, or perhaps because of its idiosyncrasies.

THE SKETCHBOOKS OF PICASSO

by Philip Vann

IN September 1974, almost a year and a half after Pablo Picasso's death, his heirs began sifting through the huge accumulation of paintings, sculptures, drawings and objects in his south of France *chateaux*. One hundred and seventy five sketchbooks, dating between 1894 and 1964 were uncovered, which included in all over 7,000 drawings and notations. At the exhibition, 'Je Suis Le Cahier' The Sketchbooks of Picasso, held at the Royal Academy of Arts, London from 11th September to 23rd November, organised by the Pace Gallery of New York (where it had already been shown) and sponsored by American Express, we were able to see some 45 of these sketchbooks, dating from 1900 to 1964, opened at particularly excellent or revealing pages.

Much has been said and written about the towering genius of the man, of his quite uncontrollable, demonic creative power, of the way that he encapsulated, in especially concentrated ways, the psychic currents and genius of the century. He has been dead now only thirteen years, and it is a slow and painstaking business putting all his bewildering richness of production in some sort of perspective, one that cannot, by its very nature, be properly achieved for a good many more years, if ever. As with Shakespeare, it seems to be the case with Picasso that more and more will go on being discovered that is powerful, complex and contradictory in less and less. This exhibition, by homing in on forty five (opened) sketchbooks allows us novel glimpses of Picasso's most rudimentary thought processes, his incipient ideas, the unmediated development of forms which, presented to us now, often undoubtedly have an artistic value inseparable from, and no less significant than, the more established ingredients of his *oeuvre*. This exhibition may thus be described as twin and concomitant to the grand Picasso Retrospective held at the Museum of Modern Art in New York in 1980.


Privileged intimacy is what this exhibition gives us. There is something attractively touching and the opposite of grandiose about the smallness and dailiness of materials. The artist had not contrived to be other than himself nor has the display of the contents of intact notebooks been a motive in their making. A Paris notebook (c. 1904) is inscribed on the front cover 'JACOB/JACOB/Jacob' and on the back 'max/max/max/MAX', alluding to the French poet and close friend of both Picasso and Apollinaire in a private, almost schoolboyish/jokish way. Sketchbook No. 57 in the exhibition, dated 1915, is obviously homemade, its cardboard leaves crudely cut, then tied together, rather than bound, with cheap string. Perhaps this was the result of wartime shortage. I don't know, but I do know that the handmade appearance enhances or at least utterly complements the wonderful contents — pencil, ink, pastel and/or watercolour drawings of an abstract cubist nature which are really finished pictures in their own right — nothing 'sketchy' about them! The inside cover has the army numbers of close friends fighting in World War

I, including Andre Salmon and Guillaume Apollinaire. The 83rd sketchbook on display, a linen covered notebook dating from 1924, is one of the smallest and simplest here. A tiny pencil is still looped in cotton ribbon to the side. The notebook is open at a pencil drawing of simple abstracted shapes (bird, moon and fish-like to my eyes), with light blue and grey brown pastels chalked in blocks to left and right. Unpretentious simplicity of material and of artistic effect are not simply coincident.

Many of Picasso's famous paintings evidently had their genesis, or at least their 'working out', in his notebooks. Characters, motifs, gestures, abstractions, of each and every one of his numerous 'periods', are presented to us in their early, 'about-to-be-discovered' forms. For the historian of Picasso's art, the sketchbooks are invaluable material in assessing the development, formulation and chronology of individual works, and as their groundwork, as has been said, inseparable from them.

Many of them are invaluable as newly-discovered art works in their own marvellous right. Some memorable images I now wish to recall. The so-called 'Satimbanques Sketchbook' (1905) contains studies of circus folk, which help clarify the evolution of his first major painting, 'Family of Saltimbanques' (1904-5). A black ink and blue watercolour of a standing harlequin, not directly connected to any extant paintings, though in spirit and subject matter similar, is a powerful image of great poetry. The black ink has been very quickly applied (Picasso was, by all accounts, a prodigiously fast worker when he wanted, without sacrificing quality), and the sketchiness is manifest in scribbly black lines or shadow wavering around the left leg, and in the rough, spontaneous blue criss-cross of the harlequin's patchwork dress. Apparently highly sketchy, but as with some of the sketchiest old Master drawings, the form is sure, compact and immensely evocative. The pose is superbly realistic — figure leaning to right, head slightly dropped, right leg erect, right arm on hip — (it *gels*) — and emotional too. The downcast face speaks of tired, gentle sorrow, as does the entire posture. This was Picasso's Blue Period, and just as the famous oil 'Family of Saltimbanques' (now in the National Gallery of Washington) is underlaid with subtly all-permeating blue, so the rough criss-crosses of blue watercolour create, in just as strong a way, a mood of sad, humorous, clownish folly.

The intimate, the lyrical potential of the sketchbook medium is fully realised in sketchbooks numbers 65 and 66 (both 1918) in which Picasso made numerous watercolour cubist portraits of his new bride, the young dancer Olga Koklova, on their honeymoon. To those who believe that cubist portraiture is by its nature a bit anti-human or even brutal in its abstracting of the human figure to new extremes of association, these sketches will be a surprise. Watercolour is applied in plain, bold blocks — cylindrical, angular, curved etc. Here we have Olga sitting in an armchair. Tenderness of feeling and confidence in form are the principal features of these harmonious, but not, in the manner of some watercolours, understated works. They are intimate and extrovert, sketches and consummate.



works of art all at once

Although throughout Picasso's life the notebooks remained private (though a handful of pages here and there were given away or sold), it is often the case that sketches are so obviously 'unsketchlike' that it becomes impossible to mark formal divisions between these and 'finished' works exhibited and sold. A classically perfect 'Mother and Child' in Sketchbook 77 (1922) is rightly considered to be one of his greatest drawings. Sketchbook 115 (1946) is larger than most at 30x39cm, and contains several collage portraits of the artist Françoise Gilot. At the Royal Academy the book was displayed open, it was wonderful to see a fully realised face and a fully realised work of art emerge. Where the book has been closed for many years, an outline of the subject's pencilled features is just visibly traced onto the opposite page. This faint, fortuitous tracing somehow adds to the work's magic and the pleasure of the sketchbook medium. Using pieces of chequered fabric, tinfoil and glossy blue paper, Picasso has conjured up the noble features of a most sympathetic woman.

To call the works on these pages 'sketches' is, in a sense, vastly to inflate the meaning of that word, but, in truth, that is what they are by the very fact of their literal 'hiding-place'. It can safely be said that up to about 1960, the sketches are mostly beautiful works of art. The inchoate, the inarticulate, the unmastered, which many a good artist will consign to his or her unalterably private notebook as an act of exorcism before getting on with real and proper 'public' works of art, hardly exist at all in Picasso's sketchbooks, or at least until about 1960. It is my belief that though the old Picasso achieved some fine works, much of his last work regressed to a standard that in his case, cannot be called infantile (since in his near-infancy he was apparently a fine artist) but which is very far below the standard of the rest of his *oeuvre*. For the first time, in old age his sketchbooks deserve to be called thus. Their sketchiness is embarrassing to behold. Sketchbook 165 (dated 1962) contains pencil and crayon drawings of male and female nudes, a satyr chasing a woman, couples making love. The forms are distorted in the primitive manner Picasso discovered decades earlier, but with a bland rubberiness which is laughable. The tense vitality in delineation that he possessed in such high, unswerving degree has gone. It is best not to dwell too long on these tired finales to a remarkably fertile life.

The very late Picasso was a cartoonist perhaps above all else, reducing complexity to easily absorbed formulae, but just occasionally this did spark off some deliciously humorous images. A 1964 notebook contains a pencil drawing of an interior with an artist and a baboon each painting the other and one of a baboon painting a man. The eager pleasure discernible in the animal's garlanded head is more than amusing. Comparing and indeed inter-changing animal with reverent, bearded artist, Picasso hints that he has no illusions about the artist's status. But then he had few artistic illusions during most of his artist's life, which is what makes these sketchbooks so extraordinarily valuable — his private vision (his these sketchbooks so extraordinarily valuable).

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

AN HONEST AUTOBIOGRAPHY

A balance of power Jim Prior Hamish Hamilton £12.95

No more honest autobiography has been written by a prominent politician than this one. To say that is not to imply that most politicians, when they write their reminiscences, set out to deceive. But the habit of a lifetime dies hard. A politician congenitally presents himself in the best possible light. Jim Prior, on the contrary, does not hesitate to describe his defeats and weaknesses.

The book has been called a testament of failure and the description is fair enough. Mr Prior has been a cabinet minister, Leader of the House of Commons, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. He is now chairman of an enormous business. Most people would settle for that kind of 'failure'. The fact remains that he is leaving politics after being defeated by a woman, Margaret Thatcher. He does not hesitate to underline her victory over him.

Though one would think him a shrewd man, he committed the folly when a reshuffle was on the way, of letting it be announced on his behalf that he would not serve in Northern Ireland. When Mrs Thatcher sent for him, one imagines that the conversation went like this: 'Jim, it's Northern Ireland, or else.' Prior: 'Or else what?' Prime Minister: 'Or else nothing.'

Jim Prior comments on this dénouement: 'The way I played the reshuffle and subsequent events considerably weakened my authority, and also the cause of the moderates on the Conservative back benches. I was out-manoeuvred by the Prime Minister: that is probably why she was Prime Minister and I was certainly never likely to be.'

But deeper reasons for his subjugation are provided here. He is far from ungenerous, though distinctly critical of the Prime Minister 'Margaret', he says, 'is a Prime Minister of great intelligence, efficiency and determination'. He confirms my supposition and, in a small way, my experience that Margaret Thatcher is well-equipped to run the whole gamut of feminine wiles. But in Jim Prior's view she had the additional advantage of representing the mood of the nation much more effectively than he or the other 'wets'. He still believes in a conservatism very different from hers. He is still horrified by the appalling unemployment and her policies of confrontation. But he persuades himself that Thatcherism, though I don't think that he uses that word, will last for ever. He ends with this rather cryptic observation: 'We are witnessing shifts in the political loyalties of the electorate and it seems to me probable that at the next election we will again see a three-way split in the vote.' We must make what we can of that.

Jim Prior, after a three-year valiant stint in Northern Ireland, however reluctant he was to go there in the first place, likes to feel that he helped to prepare the way for Mrs Thatcher's subsequent enlightenment and the notable Anglo-Irish Agreement. I would certainly wish to give him a good share of the credit, such an honourable man deserves no less.

FRANK LONGFORD

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

GCHQ, *The Secret Wireless War 1900-1986* Nigel West Weidenfeld & Nicholson £12.95

Secrecy and Democracy, the CIA in Transition Stansfield Turner Sidgwick & Jackson £12.95

The literature on Military Intelligence is now daunting in quantity, and immensely varied in quality. These two books, each outstanding, make plain how far we have already come from the old-fashioned world of espionage, from episodes of human courage, skill and intrigue, of lonely men seeking information, and — even more important — getting it (and hopefully themselves) back to their headquarters. Nowadays, as for the past 50 years, the operator's radio equipment is as important as the man, and his code-books most precious of all.

Nigel West's account of the growth of Signals Intelligence from Marconi's day until recently is remarkable for its range, for its detail, and notably for its frankness. His account of the activities in World War I, of the crowded occupants of Room 40, in the Admiralty Building, bears striking similarities, though on a tiny scale, to the occupants and activities of a certain Museum on the Suez road in World War II: the same motley collection of cryptanalysts and "the professor types", whatever their military rank, crossword-puzzle solvers, recruited in haphazard fashion, and almost all amateurs; and, as Nigel West recognises, SIME and its counter-intelligence stations in the Mediterranean and "up the blue", deciphering the low-grade ciphers of the *Wehrmacht*, played a key role in the War.

From the birth of Enigma, of course, the game became much more difficult on the outbreak of World War II, the German forces had been supplied with some 20,000 Enigma machines, whose ciphered texts were practically unbreakable. And their agents in what became the enemy countries were well supplied with signals (and cipher) equipment, as — most worrying of all — were their submarines. To make the breakthrough required brilliant engineering, mathematical skill (the Bombe machine), the 'turning' of enemy agents, and always — in War as in life — luck, not least the capture of enemy code-books (and *Unterseebooten*). Nigel West's account is rich in the human side of the story.

It is good to see the recognition given here to some key figures, like Alastair Denniston, to the Radio Security Service, staffed largely by dedicated amateurs, though in the end part of MI8, and to the R.A.F.'s intercept service, invaluable in the Battle of Britain. He concludes that Signals Intelligence is more accurate (and more verifiable), less risky and cheaper to acquire, than old-fashioned espionage. And those in it, at GCHQ and its out-stations, are precious — and vulnerable.

The issue of the human versus the machine, of the "spy" as against technologically-acquired intelligence, is also one that concerns Admiral Stansfield Turner, who served, from 1977 to 1981, as President Carter's Director of the CIA. His account is more straightforward and autobiographical than Nigel West's. He is firmly convinced of the need for human spies, and of the superiority of the US to Russia in military technology, especially in microprocessors. His account of covert operations — "the dirty tricks" of the trade — tells us nothing new. Despite the immense home resources of the US in academic and commercial knowledge of the world outside, it is clear that in the US, unlike the USSR, the handling of the "home front" is not the easiest of

the CIA's tasks. But as a key practitioner he knows better than most the difficulty of drawing a line, in a very open society, between the need for operational secrecy and the media's noisy claims that the public "needs to know". And the sheer size of the CIA, the "octopus", as he calls it, poses great problems of management, all in the glare of publicity. This is a vigorous appraisal of the CIA's recent role, and of its successes and failures.

ESMOND WRIGHT

EPISCOPACY TODAY

The Bishops Frank Longford Sidgwick and Jackson Price £12.95

This is a very readable book. The problem of reviewing it is that, before you can appraise one paragraph, you are carried on to the next, as on a surfboard, certain that something of interest is following. When future generations require a picture of the ecclesiastical scene in the Eighties of this century, they will find it here in one volume. Lord Longford has interviewed thirteen Anglican Bishops and ten Catholic ones. Their names are familiar. He has asked questions about their function, though he does not mention the juridical one, gives their standpoints on problems of today and also supplies portraits of them as men. Difficult questions are faced, among them Church government and authority, social issues, changing symbolism and the ordination of women. Behind such questions with the author and those interviewed appears a desire for Church unity. Through the Sixties and Seventies and into the Eighties there has been a desire for unity between the Anglican and Roman churches, although there continue to be problems.

In three decades the atmosphere has changed. This, I believe, was not just the result of the Second Vatican Council, Pope John XXIII was responding to something already present and giving leadership to it. The results can be seen in many places. I remember being impressed by the friendly lunches of the staffs of the Bishop of Guildford and the Bishop of Arundel and Brighton. Lord Longford mentions in particular the whole-hearted welcome given to the Pope by the Archbishop in 1982, and the way in which the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Liverpool and the Anglican Bishop have so often acted together to support the interests of Merseyside. It is remarkable too that these searching yet generous Anglican portraits should appear in a book by a Catholic. Perhaps *eirenic* is not the word to describe this approach, for that might suggest something contrived. It is sympathetic in the best sense of the word.

Possibly Lord Longford underestimates the acceptability of the Bishop of Durham, though people may not like the terms he uses or his dogmatic style. My feeling is that there is much silent support among the clergy and the enquiring laity. The position of an Anglican Bishop is different from that of a member of the Catholic hierarchy. The latter speak on matters of belief and piety to a collected congregation, members of which have accepted a discipline, though Vatican II is giving a new significance to the role of the laity. An Anglican Bishop so often is attempting to spur and inspire a number of people on the fringe who happen to be in Church for special occasions. But it must be added that the beneficial effect for example of Cardinal Hume on people not of his faith is clear. In these days when authority is challenged, the authority of holiness is still honoured.

We are given the Roman Catholic conception of the main duty of a bishop in the words of Bishop Harris. It is to promote the unity of the Church and to strengthen the faithful. The duty of a theologian, he continues, is one of

scholarship and exploration. Conscious of collective responsibility they hesitate to pronounce on current topics unless they are of one mind. One wonders how they deal with the concept of theological development. Anglican Bishops are more public figures, partly because a number of them are in the House of Lords. The Archbishop of Canterbury is in a special position and he is praised for insisting that after the Falklands war the emphasis should be on conciliation rather than triumph.

The Bishops are on the side of the underdogs and have been critical of the present government with regard to unemployment and the decay of the inner cities. The question that the author would wish to put to them is 'How far are you prepared to come out into the open and condemn the government which has no small responsibility for the situation?' Whether this is justified I do not know, but Lord Longford is right in suggesting that the Bishops should keep pressing the government. The Bishops too are concerned with the maintenance of family life, threatened by the so-called sexual revolution. One aspect of theological emphasis has been to denounce legalism. So easily an atmosphere of no rules at all can follow. In this age of expanding democracy tensions between authority and democracy in the Church have appeared. Sometimes one can look back with nostalgia to the Olympian detachment of the old style bishops. They can be over exposed.

This is a book of great interest which can be warmly recommended, not just to those within the Churches, but to all concerned about the part they play in national life.

LAURENCE TANNER

FICTION IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND

The Victorian Short Story: Development and Triumph of a Literary Genre
Harold Orel. Cambridge University Press. £25.00.

In Harold Orel's history of the late Victorian short story there is an unusually happy combination of serious literary theory, criticism and delightful entertainment. Not only are there stories told, where appropriate, but also included are contemporary illustrations, few but well chosen portraits of the authors discussed form a pleasant addition to the text and certain frontispieces to volumes of published stories indicate the prevailing taste of the time. Confining himself to writers in England, Scotland and Ireland, he explains that there is 'a gap in literary history' here. 'An English context', he thinks, 'rather than an American or Continental one' is required for the understanding of these writers and their themes.

Considerations of style and genre apart, Harold Orel analyses some of the conditions of life in late nineteenth century England. At the height of their popularity short stories clearly answered several prevailing needs. Not least of these was a hunger for reading matter amongst the newly educated population, compulsorily provided with schools by the Education Act of 1870. In an optimistic forecast, later unfulfilled, reading attainment bade fair to begin the demolition of class distinction in one of its most effectively invidious forms, that of an inability to understand the written decrees and injunctions issued to command obedience in a necessarily docile labouring class. The success of a literacy made universal should not be over-estimated, says the author, for other social and political pressures operated simultaneously.

One fact is that many novelists turned to short story writing, partly as a means of marketing work quickly and profitably, but partly because the spread of printing had been brought about by a technological revolution. The power

source for printing shops, where electricity was replacing steam and gas, drove down costs dramatically. Many of the publishing houses newly set up after 1880 bore names now famous, their foundations having been solidly laid in unprecedentedly prosperous times. Magazines were cheap and their numbers increased enormously as more and more publishers recognized a ready market. A large section of the populace now demanded entertainment coupled with moral advice, observations and facts from reputable scientific authorities about the state of the expanding universe and its relevance to religious belief and communal life. The publication of inexpensive reprints brought within reach whole series of hitherto little-read novels and treatises. Mr Orel thinks that this cheap literature, far more than the educational provision made in 1870 and after, was responsible for an increase in knowledge and expertise amongst the mass of the people.

However, the 'educational ladder' built by successive Acts establishing technical schools (whose clothes are now being borrowed by the Conservatives) created at the very least a numerate and literate readership whose needs could not wholly be met by disseminating information and instruction manuals. Once a desire to read was aroused, proliferating weeklies, monthlies, quarterlies and Christmas Annuals could find an insatiable market. Amongst those periodicals, short stories became an increasingly popular ingredient of their content. Hence, the writers of these stories would inevitably pay close attention to their style.

The book is not, however, in any sense a work of socio-economic theory. It is a measured and entirely cultivated analysis of the characteristic styles and content employed by nine major writers who, in the latter decades of the last century, moulded the story's form and shaped its subject matter. Style, the author points out, had to be thought about when the competition for readers was keener than it had ever been. Practically nothing was written by English critics on the short story, despite the fact that its practitioners were far more skilful than all but a handful of American writers, some of whom wrote prolifically on its theory. Mr Orel's bibliography is illuminating in this respect, as in others. And he quotes Robert Louis Stevenson who consented to write an essay on style for the *Contemporary Review* of April 1885. 'There is nothing more disenchanting to man,' Stevenson says, 'than to be shown the springs and mechanisms of any art.' But Stevenson goes on to describe how 'the improvable reader' desires, besides facts, other points of view than his own, other sides of an argument. One problem faced by Stevenson and others was to avoid falling into artistic traps of their own setting, when retributive judgement would be swift.

The 'literary' short story is exemplified through a consideration of the work of William Carleton, Sheridan Le Fanu, Charles Dickens, Anthony Trollope, Thomas Hardy, Robert Louis Stevenson, Rudyard Kipling, Joseph Conrad and H. G. Wells, all of whom are pre-eminent in novel writing, whatever the length of the tale. In his final chapter the author discusses the requirements of many popular magazines such as *The Strand*, in whose pages fortunes and reputations were made in a manner comparable to the 'hype' phenomenon in the media today. The emergence of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle through the medium of *The Strand* is one of the best examples.

The volume is accurate and scholarly, being so enjoyable to read that it is to be hoped that Mr Orel will discern further 'gaps' in literary history.

BETTY ABEL

EVELYN WAUGH'S EARLY LIFE

Evelyn Waugh The Early Years 1903-1939 Martin Stannard Dent, £14 95

There is no question but that the only previous extensive critical biography of Evelyn Waugh, published by Christopher Sykes in 1975, is now, however mellifluously written, urbane, and informed with personal knowledge of his subject, superceded by this impressive study by Martin Stannard, the first of two volumes. Christopher Sykes himself modestly acknowledged that 'the great quantity of documentary material on which this book is based suggests to me that other biographical studies could and perhaps should be written'. Indeed, the past decade has seen, not entirely happily for Waugh's reputation, the appearance of the bacchanalian leaves of the *Diaries* (1976) and the often misleading pages of the *Letters* (1980). Even then, as Mr Stannard points out, Mark Amory's edition of the *Letters* contained only a fifth of the correspondence at his disposal.

Mr Stannard's full and penetrative work makes enthralling reading. Unlike a number of recent, highly-lauded biographies, he does not rely excessively on his subject's own letters and diaries, whether published or unpublished. He interviewed and obtained new material from Waugh's first wife, who had not previously talked about the failed marriage, and he also interviewed, among others, Sir Harold Acton, Sir John and Penelope Betjeman, Graham Greene, Lady Diana Mosley and Alec Waugh. He writes with the objectivity which (at least the young) Evelyn Waugh so much prized, but he is not only concerned with the 'drama, speech and events' which Waugh claimed as his sphere. He has a great respect for Waugh's intellect, and he has a fine grasp of the philosophical, theological, political, and about all, aesthetic considerations which shaped Waugh's thinking and writing: this is original material. He is also particularly interesting on textual indications in the Waugh MSS of Waugh's work methods and intentions.

The only area in which Mr Stannard falters is the psychological one, and then only in the restricted sense that he insists on the incorrect employment of clinical terms such as 'paranoid boredom', 'manic-depressive boredom', or even that hoary old error inherent in the statement, 'The schizophrenic difference between his letters to Madresfield and Mells Manor was not the product of hypocrisy'. These blemishes could and should have been edited out. It *does* matter in the particular case of Evelyn Waugh, because there was, of course, actual paranoid illness later in life. Although he was always of *personalitas sensitiva* in the Corvo mould, it is absolutely wrong to ascribe to the young Evelyn Waugh 'persecution mania' or to say that he was 'a manic depressive in youth'. It is to be hoped that Mr Stannard will have obtained expert opinion on the *Pinfold* episode for his second volume: this is an important biography, and we need the best commentary here. More informed discussion on the nature of Waugh's memory-loss at the age of thirty-four, when newly installed at Piers Court with his second wife, would have been appreciated. Another reason why one raises this matter is that Mr Stannard *lui-même* prides himself on avoiding 'the amateur psychoanalysis Waugh loathed in contemporary fiction and biography'. Amusingly, he lets the concept 'death-wish' slip through! However, the truth is that Mr Stannard achieves a remarkable recreation of the habits of mind of his difficult subject, showing a rare understanding, and he could not have done so if he had not used the psychological awareness which is *implicit* in his extended discussions. Thus, for instance, while Christopher Sykes will

have it that Waugh's childhood up to his departure to Lancing was a happy one, Martin Stannard shows how there were already difficulties in the cold house, "Underhill", in Golders Green, for the younger boy, living under the looming shadow of Alec, the ideal, cricket-playing elder son of Arthur Waugh — that most badly treated paterfamilias. One of Mr Stannard's most valuable insights is his development of the idea that Evelyn Waugh was a serious man by the early age of twenty-six, and a serious writer with a considered aesthetic. In this way, the balance of previous impressions is corrected. Evelyn Waugh groaned piteously as he wrote

MOLLY TIBBS

SHORTER REVIEWS

Policing Industrial Disputes 1893 to 1985 (Methuen Paperback £5.95)

This is a valuable study by Roger Geary, whose research included interviews with 32 police officers from nine police forces and with 69 union officials. He starts with the violent mining strike at Featherstone, in which the troops were called in and two miners were killed and fourteen injured. The strikers stoned police and damaged property. The author argues from his research that since 1893 until the 1980s the confrontations between strikers and police 'tended to be less violent'. He points out that 'the inter-war period was notable for the decline of industrial disorder'. This included, of course, the General Strike of 1926. Would Mr Geary agree that the High Court declaration, albeit on doubtful legal grounds, that the strike was illegal had a quietening effect? Since 1940 violence has tended to be, until comparatively recently, restricted to the pushing and shoving' by both sides. Why then has there been the escalation of violence by both strikers and police in recent years? The main example is the miners strike 1984-5 and the printers dispute with Mr Murdoch and his papers this year, principally at his new technologically advanced printing presses at Wapping, East London, where printers are no longer needed. This study was pub-

lished originally before this last and still continuing conflict. What is the reason for this upsurge of violence? There appears to be less restraining influences within the Labour and Trade Union movements, and perhaps more particularly greater activities by extreme left wing elements. Mr Geary considers that the police over react, especially with 'get tough' encouragement from the central government. He concludes that 'some kind of formal democratic control is desperately required if the police, as they often claim, are really to police with consent'. This is a worthwhile stimulating and on occasion a controversial study.

The Directory of International Terrorism (Mamstream, £14.95). This is a useful volume by the Scottish journalist, George Rosie, with further research by Paul Rosie. George Rosie has brought together a mass of information upon terrorism in all its forms and going back a long way historically. For example, he includes the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, leading to the first world war. His method is to include, alphabetically, terrorist organisations, leading terrorists and those who support such violence and particular terrorist incidents throughout the world. There are plentiful cross references. Mr.

Rosie is full aware of the difficulties, often the impossibility, of complete accuracy in many instances. The fact that 'this book has been compiled exclusively from published sources' does not remove the need to search further for factual truth. 'Tragically, this book is almost certain to be out of date by the time it is printed' and some major incidents not included. This is inevitable but nonetheless it should be a valuable reference book within the above limitations.

China, a short cultural history (The Cresset Library, 4th edition revised and in paperback £7.95). It is a remarkable tribute that C. P. Fitzgerald's book, first published over 50 years ago, and now appearing in paperback, is still the best survey of Chinese history to the end of the Tai Ping rebellion. Visitors from the West, from the august to the humbler enquirer, will find it valuable as much for its account of political events as for its themes of religious and artistic development and of China's contacts with the West. China played a much more important part in European diplomacy than is suggested in the orthodox histories, and in fact Marco Polo's China was one of relative decline. This is indeed a readable but also a humbling story: the contrasts drawn here between eleventh-century China and contemporary Europe makes plain that the West then played the role of Barbarian that it still does, in its wars, terrorism and contempt not only for culture but for human life. Space, time past, and the future all seem to favour the East.

(E. W.)

Anthony Eden (Allen & Unwin £8.95). David Carlton's full length biography of Lord Avon was first published in 1981. It is now re-issued as an Unwin paperback in which the

author has 'simply corrected a few misprints'. He intends also to 'publish an expanded and updated edition in 1987'. This will enable him to have the advantage of examining official records, released under the thirty year rule, relating to Eden's period of office as Prime Minister, 1955-1957. This covers the Suez crisis, probably the most controversial part of his career.

The Second Book of After Midnight Stories (William Kimber £8.95). Amy Myers, an able editor, has assembled a collection of ingenious and splendidly atmospheric tales of the supernatural, in a typically entertaining Kimber ghost book. Cornwall, traditionally, is a swirling presence in its own right. Good use of historical and literary backgrounds has been made by Kelvin I. Jones, who recreates the massacre of the Jews in York in the year 1190, and by Derek Stanford, who is perfectly at home in the world of the '90s poets: how elegantly he pictures a mood with the throw-away line 'An aspect of nostalgia is often a patina of the shabby, an elegiac note sounded on a dilapidated string'. Rosalind Wade has an ear for the telling detail — 'His sister's sow had run amok in the farmyard with a strand of straw in her snout. Always a sure warning of disaster, such as a full-scale blizzard already on its way.' Lanyon Jones has conceived the excellent notion of using the setting of a "Dickensian Christmas" at a country-house hotel, in a countryside where 'the shapes of the blizzard-driven snow (were) like the sastrugi of Antarctica' which Scott encountered. Given a good idea for a plot, the mind should supply embellishments of this quality. Diverting, light reading, with a feel of Christmas, and with some memorable moments and images. (M. T.)

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